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MISSION IMPOSSIBLE:  APPLYING ARCANE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT PRECEDENT TO 
ADVANCED CELLULAR PHONES 
I.  ENTERING THE REALM OF CELLULAR PHONES AND THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 
Ron Smith was a hard-working high school student who consistently 
earned good grades.1  In fact, he hoped to enroll in college, making him 
the first in his family to attend a higher educational institution.  Instead, 
Ron and his girlfriend became pregnant his junior year in high school, 
and soon Ron was the proud father of a baby girl, Kay.  Ron knew his life 
would forever change, but he never could have imagined loving 
someone as much as he loved Kay.   
Ron worked two jobs to support his family.  His daily schedule 
started at 7:00 a.m., when he arrived at the factory, and he worked on the 
assembly line until 4:00 p.m.  Then, he grabbed a quick dinner and 
kissed his girlfriend and daughter on the cheek as he rushed out the door 
to his night job, where he drove a taxicab until 2:00 a.m.  Ron and his 
family survived on love; they hardly had any money and lived from 
paycheck to paycheck.  They stayed in an old, run-down apartment in 
the dilapidated parts of Chicago, paying only $350 per month in rent.  
Ron did not own a car, as he used public transportation to get virtually 
everywhere, never ate in restaurants, and did not have cable or a 
telephone line.  He and his girlfriend did keep one of their cellular 
phones so they could still communicate with each other when needed.   
One morning, Ron could not find his cellular phone.  Unfortunately, 
losing his phone had dramatic effects throughout the week.  While his 
daughter was at school, she became ill.  She called and called, leaving 
message after message; her father never answered.  Though Kay was not 
in danger, she was extremely upset and Ron felt terrible after hearing 
what happened.  Later that week, Ron’s brother visited.  Ron 
immediately knew something was wrong as his brother entered the 
apartment with red, swollen eyes.  He informed Ron that their mother 
passed away during the night.  His brother said he kept trying to call 
Ron’s cellular phone to tell him to come to the hospital immediately, but 
Ron never answered.  His brother got to the hospital in time to say 
goodbye to his mother; unfortunately, Ron was not so lucky. 
                                                 
1 This hypothetical is completely fictional and any resemblance to real persons or facts 
is coincidental. 
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One early morning a few days later, as Ron was pouring Kay a glass 
of orange juice, FBI agents knocked at Ron’s door and immediately 
arrested him.  Kay was terrified and bawled at the sight of her father 
being carried away in handcuffs.  The agents told Ron that they had 
evidence that he was dealing marijuana.  When Ron asked the officers to 
elaborate, they curtly stated that they obtained the evidence from his 
cellular phone, which an agent apparently found on the subway one 
week earlier.  The cellular phone contained pictures of marijuana, and it 
appeared that the possessor of the phone took them.   
Ron asked to speak with an attorney.  After Ron met with the public 
defender and expressed his disgust that the agents searched his cellular 
phone without his permission, the public defender filed a motion to 
suppress the cellular phone evidence, claiming the search was 
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.  The FBI agents 
disclosed that most of the evidence they had against Ron was contained 
within the cellular phone.  Currently, Ron is sitting in the federal district 
courtroom, where his attorney stands and requests the court to grant the 
motion to suppress the evidence. 
The Fourth Amendment rests at the cornerstone of search and 
seizure law.2  As a result, it is implicated when attempting to suppress 
evidence obtained from searches and seizures of cellular phones.  Today, 
people are more technologically dependent than ever.3  As features on 
these technological devices advance, they literally become clones of their 
owners’ minds by containing and being able to convey intimate details.4  
So, even though people are aware that it is now easier than ever to track 
their every move, they expect a high amount of privacy with their 
technological items and depend on courts to protect that privacy.5  Yet, 
                                                 
2 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 578 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
3 Christopher J. Banks, Note, The Third Generation of Wireless Communications:  The 
Intersection of Policy, Technology, and Popular Culture, 32 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 585, 585–87 
(2001).  There is growing dependence on cellular phones as evidenced by the fact that 
mobile phone use in the United States is growing.  Id. at 642.  In the United States alone, the 
number of people who access the Internet through their phone was predicted to grow 
seven hundred percent between the years 1999 and 2003, jumping from seven million to 
over sixty-one million.  Id. at 588.  Interestingly, Europe and Japan are ahead of the United 
States in the mobile phone market.  Id. at 586. 
4 Id.  For example, cellular phones are becoming much smaller in size, cost less, but are 
capable of “new and innovative services.”  Id.  People can use a cellular phone to 
“communicate by voice, . . . access phone mail, voice mail, stock prices, sports scores, and 
even restaurant reviews.”  Id. 
5 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001).  “It would be foolish to contend that 
the degree of privacy secured to citizens . . . has been entirely unaffected by the advance of 
technology.”  Id. 
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people are not conscious of what exactly is searchable within their 
cellular phones.  Questions arise regarding whether an officer can 
explore the contents of a cellular phone by investigating the phone book, 
call history, pictures taken, text messages sent, or websites visited.  All of 
these items are easily accessible to the person who possesses the cellular 
phone.  Therefore, once a government agent searches and seizes a 
cellular phone, the government possesses an astronomical amount of 
personal information about the user.   
Privacy concerns with technological devices are not an innovative 
concept.6  As early as 1968, Chief Justice Earl Warren insightfully 
recognized the difficulty of applying Fourth Amendment precedent to 
technology, stating “the fantastic advances in the field of electronic 
communication constitute a great danger to the privacy of the 
individual.”7   
With each improvement of cellular phones, the law regarding these 
devices is increasingly more outdated.8  In an effort to formulate a rule of 
law dealing with Fourth Amendment rights and technology, Justice 
Louis Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead v. United States9 acknowledged that 
the Court must adopt a construction susceptible of “meeting modern 
conditions.”10  However, the courts have struggled to keep the Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure principles up to date with the 
advancement of cellular phones.11  For example, officers are legally 
permitted to seize cellular phones because they are signs of drug activity; 
                                                 
6 Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963) (Warren, C.J., concurring).  
Diminishing privacy, which is due to advancing technology, has not gone unnoticed.  Id. 
7 Id. (referring to Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion).  “[I]ndiscriminate use of such 
devices in law enforcement raises grave constitutional questions under the Fourth . . . 
Amendment.”  Id. 
8 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 71 (1967) (stating that part of its reasoning was based 
on a fear that technological improvements would later render the law outdated). 
9 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
10 Katz overruled Olmstead because Olmstead utilized a different test, called the Trespass 
Doctrine, which was deemed “so eroded . . . that [it] . . . can no longer be regarded as 
controlling.”  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).  The Court explained that 
“once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people—and not simply 
‘areas’—against unreasonable searches and seizures it becomes clear that the reach of that 
Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any 
given enclosure.”  Id. 
11 Cf. John A. Burtis, Towards a Rational Jurisprudence of Computer-Related Patentability in 
Light of In re Alappat, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1129, 1130 (1995). 
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this contention is outdated, as today many non-drug dealers also have 
cellular phones.12   
Current cellular phones have advanced capabilities and accordingly 
need to be afforded a high degree of privacy.13  Continual developments 
with cellular phones require a re-examination of Fourth Amendment 
principles.  First, this Note provides the history of the Fourth 
Amendment along with definitions of a “search” and “seizure” and 
court interpretations of these terms.14  Second, this Note examines the 
state of the law and how it applies to cellular phones.15  Third, this Note 
provides a solution to the problems raised by suggesting a new test 
called the “Dissemination Doctrine,” which entails determining whether 
the information was voluntarily dispersed to others and whether the 
government agents utilized the proper search approach.16   
II.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:  ITS HISTORY, MEANING, AND CURRENT 
STATUS 
The Fourth Amendment applies to victims of illegal searches and 
seizures, but it also serves as a reflection of this country’s ideals of 
privacy and freedom.17  First, this Part offers a history of the Fourth 
Amendment by identifying the original intent of its creation.18  Second, 
this Part provides rules supplied explicitly by the text of the Fourth 
                                                 
12 United States v. Merritt, No. 96-1343, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 22571, at *3 (7th Cir. Aug. 
21, 1997) (stating that “a beeper and cellular telephone . . . are typical instrumentalities of 
the drug trade”); United States v. Battle, No. 97-40005-01-04-SAC, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
11572, at *27 (D. Kan. June 27, 1997) (“Money and cellular phones are common items 
associated with narcotics trafficking.”).  A conservative estimate is that over ninety million 
Americans have cellular phones.  Banks, supra note 3, at 585–86. 
13 Banks, supra note 3, at 585–88.  In fact, it was predicted that by this time, more people 
would “access the internet through a mobile device than with a personal computer.”  Id. at 
588. 
14 See infra Part II.  This Part explains the ideals behind the Fourth Amendment by 
supplying an understanding of life as it was at the time of the Fourth Amendment’s 
composition.  This Part also supplies Court interpretations of the terms “seizure” and 
“search” and focuses on the current test, called the Katz test. 
15 See infra Part III.  This Part explains why the Katz test should no longer be used and 
suggests that the file cabinet approach should be followed. 
16 See infra Part IV.  A new test, created by the author, is offered in this Part.  The test is 
called the Dissemination Doctrine, which hinges on whether the individual actually 
divulged the information to others. 
17 Benjamin A. Swift, The Future of the Exclusionary Rule:  An Alternative Analysis for the 
Adjudication of Individual Rights, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 507, 515 (1996).  “Finally, it must be 
remembered that the Fourth Amendment right to privacy is unlike any other privacy 
guarantees in that there is no way to give back that privacy.”  Id.  It is suggested that 
Fourth Amendment privacy should be considered a “fundamental right.”  Id. at 534. 
18 See infra Part II.A. 
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Amendment.19  Third, this Part briefly outlines the judicial 
interpretations of the words “search” and “seizure.”20  Finally, this Part 
demonstrates how courts apply the Fourth Amendment to different 
pieces of technology, specifically conventional telephones and 
computers.21   
A. The Heart of the Fourth Amendment:  Its History 
The beginnings of the Fourth Amendment do not lie in one person’s 
thoughts or passive activity, but in the struggle from which the United 
States of America emerged.22  The Fourth Amendment “did not emerge 
in a vacuum” but was created as a consequence of intrusive activity by 
the British government.23  Prior to America’s independence, the British 
crown, through documents called Writs of Assistance, often ordered 
local officials to search colonists’ homes, looking for evidence of 
smuggled goods or sedition.24  The main purpose of issuing Writs of 
Assistance, which resembled a very loose and vague search warrant, was 
to prevent colonists from trading with any non-British industry.25 
                                                 
19 See infra Part II.B. 
20 See infra Part II.C. 
21 See infra Part II.D. 
22 See infra Part II.A.  “President John Adams traced the origins of our independence 
from England to James Otis’ impassioned argument in 1761 against the British writs of 
assistance, which allowed revenue officers to search American homes wherever and 
whenever they wanted.”  United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 286 n.8 (1990) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
23 Rachel Gader-Shafran, Crimes and Errors Impossible To Commit:  Defining Away the 
Fourth Amendment.  Wyoming v. Houghton, 56 U.S. 295 (1999), 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 575, 584 
(1999).  “The text [of the Fourth Amendment] articulated ideas that had percolated through 
Anglo-American law for centuries.”  Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searching for 
History, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1707, 1724 (1996). 
24 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 266.  The framers originally decided not to include a 
provision like the Fourth Amendment because they believed the national government 
lacked power to conduct searches and seizures.  Id. 
25 James Leonard, Note, Criminal Procedure—Oliver v. United States:  The Open Fields 
Doctrine Survives Katz, 63 N.C. L. REV. 546, 548–49 (1985).  The Writs of Assistance were 
created to sustain Great Britain’s status as a wealthy nation.  Id.  As with most of the 
grievances that the colonists had with the British crown, the activity of issuing Writs of 
Assistance was not new, as the Star Chamber had been issuing them since the fifteenth 
century.  Tracy A. McCloskey, Note, A Sobriety Checkpoint Program that Seizes Automobiles on 
a Public Highway in the State of Michigan Without Suspicion Violates Article 1, Section 11 of the 
Michigan Constitution.  Sitz v. Department of State Police, 506 N.W.2d 209 (Mich. 1993), 71 U. 
DET. MERCY L. REV. 1095, 1098 (1994).  The Writs of Assistance allowed the king’s 
messengers to search “‘any and all places agreeable to themselves,’ where they searched 
and seized papers and goods at their will.”  Id. 
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Many abuses were associated with the Writs of Assistance, and two 
of the extremely offensive abuses were the lack of particularity and the 
lack of probable cause necessary for issuance of a Writ.26  First, the Writs 
were not particular, “authoriz[ing] the search of any place for any 
item.”27  Second, the local officials needed virtually no probable cause to 
completely tear apart the homes they were searching.28  In some 
instances, general warrants were issued by the Secretary of State, leaving 
full discretion in the hands of the local officials to conduct random, 
general, and unsubstantiated searches in the colonists’ homes.29  As a 
result, the colonists were belittled to a state of helplessness in a place of 
utmost privacy:  their homes.30   
In 1761, debates in Boston erupted, and the main focus of these 
debates was the seizure of possessions without probable cause.31  
Regarding these debates, John Adams said:  “Then and there was . . . the 
first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain.  Then and 
there the child Independence was born.”32  Consequently, the Writs of 
Assistance sparked a driving passion within the colonists that ultimately 
lead to the start of the American Revolution.33  Even though the ideals of 
                                                 
26 Leonard, supra note 25, at 548.  Under this type of system, abuses were common and 
searches and seizures went unchecked because the officials were permitted to perform 
them whenever they deemed it necessary, with no one regulating abuses of discretion.  Id. 
27 Id.  Also, the Writs of Assistance were virtually permanent, as they did not cease until 
six months after the sovereign’s death.  Id. 
28 Gader-Shafran, supra note 23, at 584.  It has been stated that “[t]he Framers of the 
Constitution created the Fourth Amendment as a direct response to the practically 
unrestrained and judicially unsupervised searches associated with general warrants and 
Writs of Assistance.”  Id. 
29 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886).  The general purpose of the Writs of 
Assistance was to seize unlawful cargo and make sure the importation duties were paid to 
Great Britain.  J. Michael Keyes, Note, State v. Rose:  The Re-emergence of Colonial Writs?, 32 
GONZ. L. REV. 177, 177 (1996). 
30 Thomas K. Clancy, Coping with Technological Change:  Kyllo and the Proper Analytical 
Structure To Measure the Scope of Fourth Amendment Rights, 72 MISS. L.J. 525, 526 (2002).  The 
framers’ fear resulted in Court decisions phrasing individual rights in terms of property 
rights, and the analogy that a “man’s house [is] his castle” soon followed.  Weeks v. United 
States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914).  As if the wide discretion given to the local authorities was 
not oppressive enough, the Sugar Act of 1764 prohibited ship-owners from bringing a 
claim of an illegal search or seizure so long as a judge found that probable cause existed.  
Gader-Shafran, supra note 23, at 583. 
31 Gader-Shafran, supra note 23, at 583.  The Boston debates arose after cargo was seized 
from ships owned by John Hancock and other prominent political figures.  Id. 
32 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625.  This quotation illustrates the extreme influence the issue the 
Fourth Amendment addresses had on our nation gaining its independence from Great 
Britain.  Id. 
33 Bradley L. Leger, Note, Thermal Imaging and the Fourth Amendment:  The Government’s 
“High-Tech Assault” on “A Once Treasured Haven” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), 
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the Fourth Amendment incited the American Revolution, the Supreme 
Court only decided a handful of cases dealing primarily with the Fourth 
Amendment within one hundred years of America’s independence.34 
Boyd v. United States35 is the first Supreme Court decision to 
thoroughly discuss the elements of the Fourth Amendment.36  Decided in 
1885, Justice Joseph Bradley authored an opinion that investigated the 
history of the Fourth Amendment.37  After reviewing Britain’s history 
with the Writs of Assistance, the Supreme Court announced the issuing 
of the Writs as “the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most 
destructive of English liberty.”38  To elaborate, Justice Joseph Bradley 
stated:  “It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his 
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of 
his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property 
. . . .”39  He further declared that these intrusions and debates were “fresh 
                                                                                                             
43 S. TEX. L. REV. 837, 839–40 (2002).  “The concerns over general warrants and Writs 
of Assistance ‘were front and center in the petition which the Continental Congress 
addressed to the King of England in 1774.’”  Id. 
34 The Supreme Court cases from 1776–1890 dealing with the Fourth Amendment are Ex 
parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878) and Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625.  There are three other cases 
between the years 1776–1890 decided by the Supreme Court that mention the Fourth 
Amendment.  Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1856); 
Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S. 469 (1833); Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75 (1807). 
35 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
36 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 497 (1976) (referring to Boyd as defining the “original 
path” in Fourth Amendment analysis). 
37 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 617.  Most of the majority opinion is a long recitation of Lord 
Camden’s discussion from Entick v. Carrington and Three Other King’s Messengers, in which 
he states that nothing in the law gives or should give magistrates open discretion and that 
there should be proper checks in place in order to adhere to the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 
626, 628. 
38 Id. at 625.  In this case, the federal government seized thirty-five people’s plate glass 
because they violated a federal statute by failing to pay an importation duty.  Id. at 617.  
The claimants were required to produce the original invoice, which they originally objected 
to but eventually handed over due to the court order.  Id. at 618.  The claimants argued that 
they should not have been compelled to provide evidence against themselves, thus 
bringing in a Fifth Amendment issue as well.  Id.  The lower courts found in favor of the 
federal government, but the Supreme Court overruled them, stating that the claimant was 
entitled to protection under both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and that the order to 
produce the invoice was unconstitutional.  Id. 
39 Id. at 630 (emphasis added).  Knowing the original purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment, courts attempted to prevent broad abuses by taking discretion away from the 
local officials.  JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 5.02 (3d ed. 
2002).  The Fourth Amendment’s interpretation is an attempt to “police the police,” but it 
has been difficult for the courts to fully understand what exactly was to be conveyed by 
each word of the Fourth Amendment.  Id.  For example, there is a struggle to determine 
whether the Fourth Amendment was intended to protect the home only or to go beyond 
the home.  Id.    
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in the memories of those who achieved our independence and 
established our form of government.”40  Remembering the abuses of the 
British crown, the Founders expounded an amendment with clear 
textual language in hopes of preventing future abuses.41 
B. Rules Provided by the Text of the Fourth Amendment 
As a result of Britain’s abuses with the Writs of Assistance, 
America’s founders created the Fourth Amendment to implement ideals 
of reasonableness, particularity, and probable cause.42  Ratified in 1791, 
the underlying foundation of the Fourth Amendment protects 
individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures.43  It states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.44 
There are two clear sections within the Fourth Amendment, and the 
Court has provided several clauses and tests from these sections.45   
The first part of the Fourth Amendment is referred to as the 
“Reasonableness Clause”; it explains who and what the Fourth 
Amendment covers, with the “who” being “the people” and the “what” 
                                                 
40 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625.  States began to pass their own laws that dealt with the rights of 
people regarding searches and seizures, and by 1787 most states had a law that addressed 
this issue.  Tracy Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment:  A Historical Overview, 77 
B.U. L. REV. 925, 972–73 (1997).  Even before States passed their own laws, in the 1760s, 
legislative bodies were formed that outlawed the issuance of general warrants, which 
evidenced that the colonists knew they were being treated unfairly.  Id. at 942–44.  In fact, 
documented activity against general warrants dates back to 1644 when a sheriff, without a 
warrant, entered a boarding house to arrest a drunk, but the sheriff was faced with an 
angry mob who unsuccessfully tried to rescue the man.  Id. at 942 n.94. 
41 Maclin, supra note 40, at 942 n.94.  “Much of what the Supreme Court has said in the 
last half century [is] that the Amendment generally calls for warrants and probable cause 
for all searches and seizures, and exclusion of illegally obtained evidence.”  Akhil Reed 
Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 757 (1994). 
42 See supra Part II.A. 
43 U.S. CONST. amend. IV, The U.S. Constitution Online, available at https://www.us 
constitution.net/const.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2005). 
44 Id.  There are fifty-four words in the Fourth Amendment.  Id. 
45 Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 302 (1984) (referring to “the text of the two clauses 
of the Fourth Amendment”). 
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being “persons, houses, papers, and effects.”46  The second part is called 
the “Warrant Clause” because it relates to warrants.47  It explains what is 
required for a warrant to be issued (“probable cause, supported by oath 
or affirmation”), and what the warrant itself must say (“particularly 
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be 
seized”).48 
The warrants that are referenced within the Fourth Amendment 
have two standards that must be met:  (1) there must be probable cause 
for a warrant to issue and (2) the warrants must be particularly 
described.49  First, probable cause is an objective concept that requires “a 
nexus between (1) the criminal activity under investigation; (2) the items 
to be seized; and (3) the place to be searched.”50  The Supreme Court 
strongly favors officers obtaining warrants before conducting a search or 
seizure.51  In fact, the Court asserted that the same amount of probable 
                                                 
46 New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U.S. 325, 359 (1985).  The Court said that the word 
“privacy” can be used to replace the Reasonableness Clause.  Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 
41, 86 (1967). 
47 T. L. O., 469 U.S. at 359.  The Court suggests applying the “literal particularity 
requirements of the second clause.”  Berger, 388 U.S. at 86. 
48 T. L. O., 469 U.S. at 359.  Both the Reasonableness Clause and Warrant Clause exist 
simultaneously, but some scholars opine that they really are separate and distinct clauses 
that do not fit together effectively.  Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth 
Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 551 (1999).  The current debate is whether a warrant is 
necessary for a police search to be reasonable or, on the other hand, whether 
reasonableness should be assessed separately from a warrant, allowing circumstances in 
which the police can use their own discretion.  Id.  It is clear that the intent of the Fourth 
Amendment was to prevent general warrants and unreasonable searches and seizures.  Id.  
Beyond these basic ideals is a gray area that allows for debate.  Id. 
49 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983).  When a magistrate looks at probable 
cause in an attempt to discern whether a warrant should issue, he looks to see whether the 
information is trustworthy and whether there is enough information to rely upon.  Id.  
When no warrant is obtained by a police officer, the court looks to determine if there is 
sufficient probable cause at the time of the search or seizure to find that a magistrate would 
have issued a warrant.  Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001). 
50 Hon. Robert H. Bohn, Jr. & Lynn S. Muster, The Dawn of the Computer Age:  How the 
Fourth Amendment Applies to Warrant Searches and Seizures of Electronically Stored Information, 
8 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 63, 65 (2003) (citing Commonwealth v. Jean-Charles, 500 
N.E.2d 1332 (Mass. 1986)).  Jean-Charles involved an insurance fraud claim brought against 
a physician in which it was found that probable cause was lacking because there was no 
evidence that the patient did not need the medical treatment that the doctor claimed to 
have provided.  500 N.E.2d 1332. 
51 United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965).  “[T]he resolution of doubtful or 
marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded 
to warrants.”  Id.  Probable cause is viewed as “fixed and unvarying” because it is an 
“objective concept.”  Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 
951, 954–56 (2003).  No amount or lack of subjective belief by a police officer is sufficient to 
meet the demands of probable cause; there must be “objective probable cause.”  DRESSLER, 
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cause that is sufficient for a magistrate to issue a warrant may not be 
enough to justify a warrantless search; hence, a search without a warrant 
is more likely to be rejected as lacking probable cause than if the officers 
conducted the same search but first obtained a warrant.52    
                                                                                                             
supra note 39, § 9.02.  The police officer’s motive is not a factor when determining probable 
cause.  Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).  For example, in Whren, the 
Supreme Court held that if a driver breaks a traffic law and the officer stops him because of 
his race, the fact that the driver broke the traffic law is sufficient to satisfy probable cause 
under the Fourth Amendment.  Id.  The police officer’s possible malicious intent is not a 
factor when looking at probable cause.  Id.  The courts do not look at the police officer’s 
motives for probable cause, but they do consider the police officer’s motives when looking 
at the reasonableness of the search, the manner the search was conducted, or the extent of 
the search.  Id. at 818. 
52 Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 109.  It could be argued that not all searches turn on probable 
cause, but on the reasonableness of the search, which factors in the degree of intrusion and 
the severity of the possible harm.  Lerner, supra note 51, at 954–56 (referring to probable 
cause as the “North Star of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence”).  In fact, people are 
constantly being searched where no probable cause exists.  Id. at 956.  Examples include 
airport searches, DUI checkpoints, and urine tests.  Id.  These searches are widely accepted 
as necessary to prevent a potential great harm, which is outweighed by the momentary 
inconvenience.  Id.  Understandably, the courts allow more latitude if the probable cause is 
pointing to a more severe crime, such as an attack by terrorist groups, as opposed to a less 
severe crime, such as a minor burglary.  See id. at 961–62.  When the seizure of technological 
devices leads to a terrorist being brought to justice or to the prevention of a possible 
terrorist attack, it is easy for people to agree that it is necessary.  See id.  Conversely, when a 
police officer seizes an individual’s technology that contains personal information, it is less 
likely the owner will be as understanding.  Id.  For example, since the September 11, 2001, 
attacks, the authorities are not willing to give latitude to possible terrorists.  Id.  In one 
instance, the seizure of a laptop used by an al-Qaeda operational planner yielded at least 
six hiding places of terrorist leaders.  Jack Kelley, Seized Laptop Lists al-Qaeda Hideouts, USA 
TODAY, Mar. 13, 2003, at 9A, available at LEXIS, News, ALLNWS File.  By seizing his 
computer, satellite phone, and cellular phone, a man who was influential in planning the 
September 11th attacks, the bombing of the USS Cole near Yeomen in October 2000, and 
other recent terrorist actions against the United States, was arrested.  Id.  Another example 
is when officials seized four laptops from an organizer of the September 11th attacks that 
contained images of potential future targets of terrorist attacks.  Richard Sisk, Laptops IDD 
U.S. Targets Seized After Shootout, DAILY NEWS, Sept. 18, 2002, at 9, available at LEXIS, News, 
ALLNWS File.  It is easy to agree with authoritative action when such positive results 
surface, but it is hard to draw the line of what is appropriate for the interest of justice and 
what is downright intrusive.  See generally United States v. Al-Marri, 230 F. Supp. 2d 535 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).  In Al-Marri, a man from Qatar, who was pursuing his academic studies of 
computer science in the United States, was accused of being a terrorist.  Id. at 536.  He 
voluntarily consented to the search of his apartment, which the police implied as consent to 
search his laptop because it was within the apartment.  Id. at 537.  The police took his 
laptop from his home and searched it for several days.  Id.  The court determined that this 
search and seizure was constitutional for several reasons.  Id. at 539–41.  First, because the 
suspect consented to the search, a warrant was not necessary.  Id. at 539.  Second, the 
defendant did not place any explicit limits on the search.  Id. at 539–40.  The court held that 
because he was a computer science graduate student, the defendant could have given 
specific instructions on how he wanted them to search his computer and if there were any 
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Second, unlike the probable clause element, the particularity 
requirement of the Warrant Clause is more difficult to define because it 
is limited by words.53  For example, it has been held that the “degree of 
specificity required will depend on the circumstances of the case and on 
the type of items involved.”54  In United States v. Horn,55 the Eighth 
Circuit concluded that a general warrant is sufficient if the items “to be 
seized cannot be more precisely identified at the time that the warrant is 
issued.”56   
The Supreme Court determined that the goals served by the 
particularity requirement are “to prevent general searches, to prevent the 
seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another, and to prevent 
warrants from being issued on vague or dubious information.”57  Thus, it 
is intended to be flexible and only requires “reasonable specificity.”58  
Accordingly, if a “specific item characteristic of a generic class of items 
                                                                                                             
files he wanted them to refrain from searching.  Id. at 540.  Third, because the defendant 
requested his computer back and the FBI agents told him he could not have his computer 
back that night and he did not ask for it back within any certain period of time, he did not 
effectively set a limit on how long the agents could keep his computer.  Id. 
53 United States v. Johnson, 541 F.2d 1311, 1314 (8th Cir. 1976) (stating that the Supreme 
Court has employed a “practical accuracy” standard with the particularity requirement). 
54 United States v. Horn, 187 F.3d 781, 788 (8th Cir. 1999).  “Applications and affidavits 
should be read with common sense and not in a grudging, hyper technical fashion.”  
Walden v. Carmack, 156 F.3d 861, 870 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Ventresca, 380 
U.S. 102, 109 (1965)). 
55 187 F.3d at 788. 
56 Id; see also United States v. Rabe, 848 F.2d 994, 997–98 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that a 
warrant allowing for the search of a residence that was limited to materials “depicting 
minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct as those terms are defined in [the statute]” was 
sufficiently particular). 
57 Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 560 (2004).  The place that is to be searched must be 
described effectively so that the officer can identify it by using only reasonable effort.  
Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925).  Thus, it is particular enough to simply give 
the street address of a home to be searched, but more than just the street address is 
necessary if it is a multiple-unit structure.  See id. at 502–03.  The warrant will not be 
automatically declared unconstitutional if only a street address is given and the executing 
officer finds that it is a multiple unit structure, but the executing officer cannot search the 
entire unit.  See id.  Rather, he must use reasonable effort to limit the search, such as 
checking names on mailboxes or asking neighbors.  See id. 
58 Bohn, Jr. & Muster, supra note 50, at 65.  Even still, the Supreme Court upheld a search 
of the wrong premises because there must be “some latitude for honest mistakes.”  
Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 87 (1987).  In Garrison, the police officers were executing 
a valid warrant and upon entering what they thought was the only apartment that was on 
the third floor, they discovered there were actually two apartments and they were in the 
wrong one.  Id. at 80.  However, before realizing they were in the incorrect apartment, they 
had already found the marijuana that was the basis of the defendant’s conviction.  Id. at 86–
89.  The Court upheld this seizure as reasonable because the warrant was detailed and they 
had no reason to know that they were in the wrong apartment.  Id. 
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defined in the warrant” is seized, the seizure will most likely be upheld 
as constitutional.59  For instance, in United States v. Reyes,60 the warrant 
allowed for a seizure of business records, and because some of the 
business records were being kept on cassette tape, the Tenth Circuit held 
that the seizure of the tapes was constitutional.61   
The particularity requirement serves two functions.62  First, it 
informs the officers of what they are allowed to specifically search and 
seize.63  Second, it notifies the person who is being searched or seized of 
what the officers are allowed to take.64  In Katz v. United States,65 the 
Supreme Court concluded that no discretion should be left up to the 
executing officers when conducting a search or seizure.66  Thus, if it is 
found that a warrant lacked particularity but the officers acted with 
restraint, the officers’ actions still may be held unconstitutional because 
the restraint is to be imposed by the magistrate, not the officers.67  
                                                 
59 United States v. Reyes, 798 F.2d 380, 383 (10th Cir. 1986).  A federal district court case 
in North Dakota involved child pornography in which a warrant authorized seizing any 
items that could contain evidence of child pornography, including a computer.  United 
States v. Gleich, 293 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1089 (D.N.D. 2003).  Not only one, but three 
computers were found and seized during the search.  Id.  The court did not suppress the 
evidence found on the three computers because it reasoned that the warrant  was not to be 
read “so narrowly as to limit the search and seizure to only one computer.”  Id. 
60 798 F.2d 380. 
61 Id. at 383.  This case involved a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine.  
Id. at 381.  Reyes received shipments of cocaine and provided financial backings for the 
transactions. Id. at 382.  The tapes contained conversations between Reyes and the co-
conspirators.  Id. at 383. 
62 Bohn, Jr. & Muster, supra note 50, at 65.  “A particular warrant also ‘assures the 
individual whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing 
officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search.’”  Groh, 540 U.S. at 561 
(citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977)). 
63 Bohn, Jr. & Muster, supra note 50, at 65. 
64 Id. 
65 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967). 
66 Id.; see Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 575 (2004) (“The Warrant Clause’s principal 
protection lies in the fact that the ‘Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between 
the citizen and the police . . . so that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade [the 
searchee’s] privacy in order to enforce the law.’” (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 
U.S. 451, 455 (1998))). 
67 Groh, 540 U.S. at 575.  Otherwise, discretion is left up to the police officers, which is 
precisely from whom it was meant to be eliminated.  Id.  Along with the rules provided by 
the text of the Warrant Clause, another rule is that warrantless searches and seizures are 
presumptively unconstitutional.  Lerner, supra note 51, at 954–55.  Conceptually, these 
unconstitutional warrantless searches and seizures automatically trigger the Exclusionary 
Rule.  Id.  According to the Exclusionary Rule, any evidence that is obtained through a 
method that violates the Fourth Amendment is excluded from the trial.  DRESSLER, supra 
note 39, § 21.  Weeks v. United States was the first case to hold that there is a federal 
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Even though the Fourth Amendment is divided into clear sections, it 
proves to be problematic when applied, but the courts have attempted to 
make it manageable by providing specific tests and definitions.68  Since 
                                                                                                             
Exclusionary Rule.  232 U.S. 383 (1914).  Mapp v. Ohio extended this rule to the state courts.  
367 U.S. 643 (1961).  The purpose behind the Exclusionary Rule is to remove the “incentive 
to disregard” the Fourth Amendment, and so deterrence of intrusive police searches and 
seizures is its primary goal.  DRESSLER, supra note 39, § 21.  Three main exceptions to the 
Exclusionary Rule are the Plain View Doctrine, the Good Faith Exception, and the Fruit of 
the Poisonous Tree Doctrine.  Id.  First, the Plain View Doctrine establishes that evidence 
that is of an obvious incriminating nature can be seized without a warrant if it is in plain 
view of the police officer lawfully present at the scene.  Id. § 15.  The Plain View Doctrine is 
logical because without it, more time and energy would be needed to obtain obviously 
incriminating evidence, and it would be dangerous not to obtain the evidence because it 
may subsequently be stolen, hidden, or destroyed.  See generally Donald Resseguie, Note, 
Computer Searches and Seizures, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 185, 191 (2000).  Also, the police could 
later be harmed by weapons discovered that were in plain view and not seized.  Id.  Yet, if 
the evidence is moved even slightly, the Plain View Doctrine is not applicable.  Arizona v. 
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328–29 (1987).  In Hicks, a police officer was helping with the 
authorized search of an apartment, and he recognized a stereo within the apartment that 
matched the description of one recently stolen in a robbery that was separate from the 
crime he was investigating.  Id. at 323.  The police officer moved the stereo slightly so he 
could see the serial number, and this movement was enough to render the Plain View 
Doctrine inapplicable, and consequently the evidence was suppressed.  Id. at 328–29.  If he 
could have read the serial number without moving the stereo, there would have been no 
constitutional problem, but because the serial number was not in the officer’s plain view, 
he violated the Fourth Amendment.  Id.  The dissent in Hicks determined that the decision 
“trivializes the Fourth Amendment” by making a distinction that determines a 
constitutional outcome based upon moving an item an inch versus not moving it at all.  Id. 
at 333 (Powell, J., dissenting).  Second, and probably the most well-known, is the Good 
Faith Exception, which provides that evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant that later is 
declared unconstitutional can still be admitted if the warrant would be believed to be valid 
by a well-trained police officer.  United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905 (1984).  This is an 
objective standard that does not encompass improperly executed warrants.  Id.  The third 
influential exception to the Exclusionary Rule is the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine, 
which states that evidence that is not a fruit of the poisonous tree is admissible.  Nardone v. 
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).  In this case, the prosecution attempted to use 
evidence that was obtained in a manner that violated a state law, and the evidence was 
suppressed because the prosecution could not prove it could get it in an independent way.  
Id.  There are three main exceptions to the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine:  (1) the 
independent source doctrine, (2) the inevitable discovery rule, and (3) the attenuated 
connection principle.  Id.  The independent source doctrine states that so long as evidence 
was found in a legally seized manner, it is admissible.  See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. 
United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).  Next, the inevitable discovery rule states that 
evidence can be admitted so long as the prosecutor proves by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the challenged evidence ultimately would have been discovered by lawful 
means.  Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984).  Finally, the attenuated connection 
principle asserts that evidence secured by illegal police conduct still can be admitted if the 
connection between the illegality and the challenged evidence has become so “attenuated 
as to dissipate the taint.”  Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341. 
68 See infra Part II.C.  For example, a major topic of concern includes the numerous 
exceptions to the warrant requirement, which have generated many holes in the Fourth 
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the enactment of the Fourth Amendment, the courts have endeavored to 
define exactly what is meant by the terms search and seizure and what is 
necessary for a valid warrant to issue.69   
C. Defining a Search and a Seizure 
Despite the fact that the Fourth Amendment has two main sections, 
referred to as the Reasonableness and Warrant Clauses, the Constitution 
fails to specifically define “search” and “seizure.”70  The Supreme Court 
attempted to define both of these terms, but the Court’s drastic changes 
in Fourth Amendment analysis illustrate that the definitions of these 
                                                                                                             
Amendment, making it “basically unrecognizable.”  California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 
582 (1991).  In Justice Scalia’s concurrence, he pointed out that there are at least twenty-two 
exceptions to the warrant requirement.  Id.  Eleven of these exceptions are:  “searches 
incident to arrest . . . automobile searches . . . border searches . . . administrative searches of 
regulated businesses . . . exigent circumstances . . . search[es] incident to non-arrest when 
there is probable cause to arrest . . . boat boarding for document checks . . . welfare searches 
. . . inventory searches . . . airport searches . . . [and] school search[es].”  Id. (citing Craig M. 
Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1473–74 (1985)).  Scalia 
pointed out that since the time of that article, two more exceptions have been added, 
including searches of mobile homes and searches of government employees’ offices.  
Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 582–83.  The number of exceptions suggests that the rule works in the 
opposite direction, with people first looking for an exception before even considering the 
rule.  Lerner, supra note 51, at 954–56.  Further, many of the warrant exceptions are 
inapplicable to technological devices.  Darla W. Jackson, Protection of Privacy in the Search 
and Seizure of E-Mail:  Is the United States Doomed to an Orwellian Future?, 17 TEMP. ENVTL. L 
& TECH. J. 97, 102 (1999) (stating that the laws regarding electronic communication are 
confusing because they have come from “‘patchwork legislation’ resulting from additions 
to existing laws,” and these statutes are “famous . . . for a ‘lack of clarity’”).  An example of 
an exception to the warrant requirement that is inapplicable to technology is called a search 
incident to an arrest.  Id.  This allows for the search of a person being arrested and the 
seizure of items within his immediate control without first obtaining a warrant.  Id.  
Originally, this exception was created to protect the arresting police officer by allowing him 
to seize weapons near the arrestee and to prevent the suspect from destroying or 
concealing evidence.  Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).  In its examples, the 
Court made references to guns.  Id.  However, in the case of technology, unless the 
computer or cellular phone is used to hit the officer over the head, seizing the item for the 
protection of the officer is not necessary.  Jackson, supra, at 107.  Preserving evidence is a 
noble cause, but in the case of technology, it is not necessary to do so without first 
obtaining a warrant.  Id.  The same information can be gathered after a warrant is first 
obtained.  Id. at 115. 
69 Jackson, supra note 68, at 115; see Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998) (Scalia, J., 
concurring).  In his concurrence, Justice Scalia stated that “the answer is not remotely 
contained in the Constitution, which means it is left—as many, and indeed most, important 
questions are left—to the judgment of state and federal legislators,” which shows that in 
many instances the Constitution has allowed for analysis and explanation by legislators 
and judges.  Id. at 98. 
70 See infra Part II.C. 
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terms are not concretely settled.71  Originally, the Supreme Court laid out 
the Trespass Doctrine, which provided that a search did not occur unless 
there was a physical intrusion into a “constitutionally protected area.”72  
Utilizing the Trespass Doctrine in Olmstead v. United States,73 the 
Supreme Court held that interception of conversations using a wiretap 
was not a search because conversations are not “persons, papers or 
effects” and consequently are not constitutionally protected.74   
However, the validity of the Trespass Doctrine began to deteriorate 
by the Supreme Court’s decision in Silverman v. United States,75 where it 
decided that a search occurred when a microphone was inserted in a 
wall, which barely intruded into the speaker’s side, not because of the 
physical trespass of the wall, but for other reasons:  “Fourth Amendment 
rights are not inevitably measurable in terms of ancient niceties of tort or 
real property law.”76  The Trespass Doctrine was eventually overruled by 
Katz, where the Supreme Court provided a definition of a search through 
a two-prong test.77  Even though the law has undergone a 
metamorphosis, the Court attempts to provide current definitions of 
“seizure” and “search” through Katz and its prodigy. 
                                                 
71 See Randolph S. Sergent, Note, A Fourth Amendment Model For Computer Networks and 
Data Privacy, 81 VA. L. REV. 1181, 1185–90 (1995). 
72 Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 142 (1962).  In this case, the Court determined that a 
jail is not a constitutionally protected place and thus recording a conversation within does 
not violate the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 143; see also Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 
505, 510 (1961).  The Court held that offices and homes are constitutionally protected but 
that there has to be a physical intrusion.  DRESSLER, supra note 39, § 7.02.  Therefore, “eyes 
and ears cannot ‘search’ or ‘seize,’ as neither can trespass.”  Id. 
73 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
74 Id. at 472.  The defendants sought to suppress evidence of telephone conversations in 
which they discussed selling liquor, which was illegal.  Id. at 456.  The case dealt with a 
conspiracy involving over fifty individuals.  Id.  The Court held that wiretaps can trespass, 
but because the lines were not on the property, there was no trespass in this case.  Id. at 466.  
In its holding, the Court acknowledged that the act was unethical but declared that ethics 
cannot drive the determination of the constitutionality of an act.  Id. at 468.  The Court 
stated that the absence of an intrusion on the person’s premises was a “vital factor” in 
finding there was not a search.  Id.  Also, the Supreme Court held that a search done on a 
boat by utilizing a searchlight did not constitute a search because a searchlight cannot 
trespass.  United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927). 
75 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). 
76 Id.  Instead, the Court focused on the importance of protecting the home by stating 
that “[a]t the very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be 
free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”  Id.  The Court held that because the 
police did not have a warrant and entered the home, the Fourth Amendment was violated.  
Id. at 512. 
77 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  Katz completely ended the life of the 
Trespass Doctrine by holding that the fact that the recording device “did not happen to 
penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance.”  Id. at 353. 
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1. Seizure   
The Supreme Court has defined a seizure as a “meaningful 
interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.”78  
For example, a seizure occurs when police remove or destroy property or 
when they secure the premises where property is contained.79  
Conversely, a seizure does not occur when an officer picks up and 
immediately replaces or slightly moves an object because there is no 
meaningful infringement of the possessory interest.80   
In United States v. Jacobsen,81 the Supreme Court held that the police 
officer taking a small trace of a sample of white powder from a package 
for testing, which subsequently turned out to be cocaine, did not 
constitute a seizure because there was no “meaningful interference [of 
the] individual’s possessory interests in that property.”82  Similarly, in 
Arizona v. Hicks,83 the Supreme Court held that no seizure occurred even 
though the officer moved a stereo to read its serial number because, 
again, the individual’s possessory interest was not meaningfully 
                                                 
78 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).  Part of the reason the Court held 
there was no meaningful interference is because the respondents did not even notice that 
any of the substance was taken.  Id. at 113, 125. 
79 Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985).  In this case, the defendant was 
convicted of distributing obscene materials, which was a violation of Maryland law.  Id. 
80 Id.  In Macon, the officer bought a magazine from the defendant who was selling 
obscene materials.  Id.  It was determined that no seizure occurred: 
[The seller] voluntarily transferred any possessory interest he may 
have had in the magazines to the purchaser upon the receipt of the 
funds.  Thereafter, whatever possessory interest the seller had was in 
the funds, not the magazines. At the time of the sale the officer did not 
“interfere” with any interest of the seller; he took only that which was 
intended as a necessary part of the exchange. 
Id. at 469 (citations omitted). 
81 466 U.S. 109 (1984). 
82 Id. at 113.  Another area of concern discussed in Jacobsen is referred to as government 
action.  Id. (citing Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980)).  The Court determined 
that Fourth Amendment protection is only afforded in cases where there is governmental 
action.  Id.  Any government participation, including encouraging, monitoring, or advising, 
implicates governmental involvement.  Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers 
and Computer Data, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75, 79 (1994).  Yet, the Supreme Court held that 
private party searches can implicate the Fourth Amendment but only when the 
government has the knowledge and intent to assist.  Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113.  In this case, a 
private party opened a package and found white powder in it.  Id. at 111.  Then, a federal 
agent was called to inspect the questionable substance, and the Court held that there was 
no government action because the inspection by the federal agent came after a private 
search was already conducted and the government did not know about the private search 
before it occurred.  Id. at 111, 126.  Any privacy interest was already frustrated by the 
private party search.  Id. 
83 480 U.S. 321, 321 (1987). 
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affected.84  Also, in United States v. Criminal Triumph Capital Group, Inc.,85 
a federal district court held that so long as the original item is not 
harmed, making copies of that item is not considered a seizure.86  As 
illustrated by these cases, the Supreme Court has provided a logical 
definition of a seizure, but a seizure is only one part of the Fourth 
Amendment.    
2. Search 
Unlike seizures, the judicial system has struggled in defining a 
search, as evidenced by its lack of an explicit definition.87  In Katz, the 
Supreme Court handed down the current determination of a search 
through a two-prong test.88  Katz established that the Fourth Amendment 
protects people and not places, and in order to find that a 
constitutionally protected search occurred, both a subjective and 
objective standard must be met.89  Therefore, under the Katz test, the 
person must have a subjective expectation of privacy, and it has to be 
objectively determined that this expectation of privacy is one that 
“society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”90   
                                                 
84 Id.  Even though there was no seizure, it was determined that this action was a search 
that was unconstitutional because the serial number was not in plain view and there was 
no probable cause.  Id. at 328–29.  The Plain View Doctrine exists so police officers can 
protect themselves and seize obviously incriminating items, such as a gun in plain view.  
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993). 
85 211 F.R.D. 31 (D. Conn. 2002). 
86 Id.  In this case, the attorney made a copy, or “mirror image” of the hard drive.  Id.  
The court held that “[i]t is a reasonable and routine procedure for a computer examiner to 
save or back up the mirror image to another medium . . . for examination purposes.  The 
fact that he created a [copy] does not mean that he seized the entire hard drive.”  Id. at 48.  
In another case, officers searched and seized the defendant’s computer, and it was held 
reasonable for the officers to make a “safeback” copy of the hard drive.  Fenton v. Pellitier, 
No. 03-281-P-H, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20101 (D. Me. Oct. 5, 2004). 
87 Sergent, supra note 71, at 1187 n.24.  One reason it is hard to define is because there are 
many possible ways a police officer can perform a search.  Id.  A second reason it is hard to 
define is because the definitions have drastically changed.  Id. 
88 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).  This case has 
not been expressly overruled by the Supreme Court and is currently used as the test for 
determining whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred.  Id. 
89 Id.  Subjective expectations are influenced by what the laws currently are.  Clancy, 
supra note 30, at 531; Sergent, supra note 71, at 1189. 
90 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.  It was directly asserted that the Fourth Amendment does not 
protect items that were exposed to the public, but it does protect items that a person sought 
to keep protected, even if it is accessible to the public.  Id. at 361–62.  The Court provided 
this standard because if people seek to protect items, they have a reasonable subjective and 
objective expectation of privacy.  Id.  Conversely, if information is exposed to the public, 
even though a person may have a subjective expectation of privacy, the objective 
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In Katz, FBI agents obtained evidence, without first acquiring a 
warrant, of a man’s illegal gambling activity by placing a recording 
device on a telephone booth and listening to his conversations.91  The 
Court held that the evidence was not admissible because it violated the 
Fourth Amendment.92  As part of the Court’s reasoning, it found that 
even though the agents showed restraint, that restraint should not have 
been self-inflicted but should have been ordered by a magistrate through 
a warrant, which was not obtained.93   
Overall, the judicial system has struggled in defining both the 
subjective and objective standards of the Katz test.94  When applying the 
subjective standard, its definition varies because it depends on the 
citizen’s understanding of technology as well as society’s ever-changing 
attitudes.95  For example, because people are now aware that computers 
can track their actions, purchases, and whereabouts, citizens’ subjective 
expectations of privacy with respect to computers are less than they were 
prior to widespread computer use.96 
Unlike the subjective prong, the Supreme Court has provided three 
factors to consider within the objective prong of the Katz test.97  When 
determining if there is a reasonable objective expectation of privacy, the 
Court examines the following:  (1) the nature of the property inspected; 
                                                                                                             
expectation of privacy cannot be met because it is unreasonable.  Id. at 351–52.  Even 
though the Fourth Amendment does not contain the word “privacy,” the test is based on 
both the subjective and objective expectations of privacy.  Michael P. Jewkes, Note, Just 
Scratching the Surface:  DNA Sampling Prior to Arrest and the Fourth Amendment, 35 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 125, 128 (2001). 
91 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.  The defendant was convicted of wagering gambling bets.  Id. at 
354.  The FBI agents who were investigating him saw the man place calls from a telephone 
booth at the same time every day, and, without first obtaining a warrant, the agents 
attached a device that allowed them to listen to and record the man’s conversations that 
took place in the telephone booth.  Id. at 348, 357. 
92 Id. at 353.  The government’s actions “violated the privacy upon which he justifiably 
relied” and thus there was a search and seizure.  Id. 
93 Id. at 356; see also Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001). 
94 See infra Part III.C. 
95 Clancy, supra note 30, at 531; Sergent, supra note 71, at 1189.  Therefore, if the law 
allows for the government to monitor people constantly by having video cameras on every 
streetlight, subjective expectations of privacy naturally decrease.  DRESSLER, supra note 39, 
§ 7.03. 
96 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 590 n.21 (1979) (“The reasonableness of the expectation 
must include an objective component that refers to those aspects of human activity that the 
‘reasonable person’ typically expects will be protected from unchecked Government 
observation.”).  “[T]hese three variables—regulatory policy decisions, existing technical 
infrastructure, and popular culture—are neither exogenous, nor independent; rather, they 
are intertwined.”  DRESSLER, supra note 39, § 7.03. 
97 DRESSLER, supra note 39, § 7.04. 
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(2) the extent to which a person has attempted to keep the property 
private; and (3) the degree of intrusion inflicted by the police.98  First, the 
Court heavily considers the nature of the property, despite previously 
stating that the Fourth Amendment protects people and not places.99  For 
example, the Fourth Amendment does not protect activity that occurs in 
an open field.100  However, activity that occurs within a person’s home is 
protected.101   
Second, the Supreme Court determined that no Fourth Amendment 
protection is afforded to items a person allowed the public to see or 
hear.102  In California v. Ciraolo,103 the defendant, who was growing 
                                                 
98 Id.  The objective prong is based on a reasonableness standard.  Id. 
99 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 (1998).  In this case, a drug deal occurred within a 
home, and the Court held that because the home was being used as a commercial meeting 
place for a drug transaction, it was to be treated as a commercial place, which brings a 
different outcome than if it was treated as a residence.  Id. at 90–91.  The Supreme Court 
held that the home is still to be considered a special place in which “all details are intimate 
details.”  Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001).  In 2004, the Supreme Court decided 
that, “‘the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable 
governmental intrusion’ stands ‘[a]t the very core of the Fourth Amendment.’”  Groh v. 
Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004) (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001)).  
Probably the best summation of contemporary views on the Fourth Amendment was 
proclaimed by William Pitt: 
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the force of the 
Crown.  It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow 
through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of 
England may not enter; all his force dares not cross the threshold of the 
ruined tenement. 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 1.1(a) at 
4 (3d ed. 1996) (citing N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 49–50 (1937)).  Therefore, commercial 
structures are treated differently than residential structures because expectations of privacy 
are greater in the home than anywhere else.  DRESSLER, supra note 39, § 6.03.  Society’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy drives the objective prong, and because society teaches 
the importance of the sanctity of the home, this view has been accepted.  Id.  For example, 
the objective expectation of privacy within the home exists even if the home’s windows and 
doors are not locked.  Id. 
100 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).  This case occurred during the 
Prohibition, and a man was convicted for concealing liquor.  Id.  He disposed of the jug in a 
field while running.  Id. at 58.  The defendant tried to claim that the police violated his 
Fourth Amendment right to privacy because they went onto his father’s open field without 
a warrant.  Id.  However, the Court found that there is no Fourth Amendment protection in 
an open field.  Id. at 59. 
101 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[P]ersonal 
security in one’s home [is] an assurance which has become part of our constitutional 
tradition.”).  “Entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth 
Amendment is directed.”  United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). 
102 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).  This case has been distinguished, but 
for the most part other courts have followed it.  Id. 
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marijuana in his backyard, attempted to hide it by building a ten-foot-
high fence around his property.104  The evidence was not suppressed 
because, even though the Court acknowledged the defendant’s effort to 
veil the plants by building a fence, the Court also noted that the police 
should not have to “shield their eyes” to illegal activity.105  Also, when 
determining if a person took steps to ensure his privacy, the Supreme 
Court found that once someone gives another information, he “assumes 
the risk” that the person receiving the information is either a police 
officer or that the information will be turned over to the police.106   
Third, the Supreme Court declared that the amount of police 
intrusion is also a factor in the objective prong of the Katz test.107  Florida 
v. Riley,108 which factually resembled Ciraolo, involved the police, who 
did not first obtain a warrant, using aerial surveillance in an attempt to 
discover marijuana growing in the person’s greenhouse.109  The Court 
determined that a search did not occur because the defendant exposed 
his greenhouse to the view of anyone flying overhead, and therefore the 
Fourth Amendment was not violated.110  The Supreme Court reasoned 
that neither the police nor their equipment interfered with the 
defendant’s normal use of the greenhouse because the helicopter did not 
make any “undue noise, and no wind, dust, or threat of injury.”111   
Fourth Amendment analysis does not end with an understanding of 
its history, definitions, and current status.  As with most standards, the 
true test lies in its application.  To fully understand the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment with technology, it is beneficial to examine how the 
                                                                                                             
103 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
104 Id. at 209.  After receiving an anonymous tip, the police were performing an aerial 
search of his home and noticed the cultivation of marijuana plants.  Id. 
105 Id. at 213.  The Court pointed out that someone sitting on top of a bus or in a tree 
would have been able to see the marijuana plants as well.  Id. at 211. 
106 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942).  The Court recognized that this 
principle is sound and has been rightfully followed for years.  Id. 
107 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 453 (1989).  Compliance with the laws alone is not 
enough to prove that the government search was not intrusive.  Id. 
108 488 U.S. 445 (1989). 
109 Id. at 448.  In this case the police used a helicopter instead of an airplane.  Id.  The 
Court determined that helicopter use is common because every state uses helicopters in 
police work.  Id. at 451 n.2. 
110 Id. at 451–52.  In this case, the police flew the helicopter extremely close to the ground.  
Id. at 451.  The altitude flown was forbidden by government regulation for airplanes but 
was not forbidden for helicopters.  Id. at 451 n.3.  The result would have been different if 
the officers were flying an airplane and broke the law.  Id. at 451. 
111 Id. at 452. 
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courts actually utilize it with technological devices, such as conventional 
telephones and computers. 
D. Applying the Fourth Amendment to Technology 
As technology rapidly advances, the courts have difficulty keeping 
Fourth Amendment standards of a search and seizure current and 
applicable.112  The Supreme Court has defined the intent of the Fourth 
Amendment by continually referencing its historical roots and 
establishing precedent regarding its key terms.113  Additionally, the 
Court has provided the Katz test, which created both a subjective and 
objective component, to aid in the analysis of the Fourth Amendment.114  
An instructive way to analyze advancing technology, including cellular 
phones, is to look at how the courts dealt with similar devices in the 
past.115 
1. Conventional Telephones 
The main principle regarding telephones and the Fourth 
Amendment is that no protection is afforded to a person who mistakenly 
believes that a person in whom he confides will keep the information 
confidential.116  Hence, most actions taken by police officers with 
telephones, including listening in, recording, or obtaining information 
from an informant, are upheld because they typically involve a person’s 
erroneous belief in the trustworthiness of another.117  The Supreme Court 
noted that “dangers . . . are present in executing a warrant for the 
‘seizure’ of telephone conversations” because “responsible officials, 
including judicial officials, must take care to assure that they are 
conducted in a manner that minimizes unwarranted intrusions upon 
privacy.”118  A thorough examination of case precedent is warranted to 
determine which types of searches lessen privacy intrusions.119 
                                                 
112 See infra Part III. 
113 See supra Parts II.A, II.B. 
114 See supra Part II.C. 
115 See infra Part II.D. 
116 Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).  In this case, the defendant made 
statements about trying to bribe a juror in his trial to a third party who turned him into the 
authorities.  Id. 
117 See infra Part II.D. 
118 Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976).  It is inevitable that the officers 
will hear conversations that are not within the limits of the warrant because the only way 
to determine if the conversation is relevant is to listen to it.  Id. 
119 Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990) (“Our cases show that in determining 
reasonableness, we have balanced the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment 
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The courts established clear rules pertaining to who can claim a 
Fourth Amendment right with telephones.120  First, Fourth Amendment 
rights are personal and so to successfully establish them in a telephone 
conversation, the person asserting the right must be a party to the 
conversation.121  For example, if the only parties involved in the 
telephone conversation are a police officer and a party other than the 
drug dealer attempting to raise a Fourth Amendment violation, the drug 
dealer cannot successfully seek Fourth Amendment protection.122  
Second, because courts have consistently held that there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy when placing a telephone call, it is 
constitutionally permissible for officers to listen to conversations either 
personally or through the assistance of third parties.123  Further, in United 
                                                                                                             
interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”); see also Bartnicki v. 
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001) ( “In considering that balance, we acknowledge that some 
intrusions on privacy are more offensive than others.”). 
120 See infra Part II.D. 
121 United States v. Fernandez-Roque, No. 96-4351, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2716 (4th Cir. 
Feb. 14, 1997).  The personal interest being described is more commonly referred to as 
standing.  Id. at *2.  In order to bring a constitutional claim in any court, the person must 
prove he has standing, and to show that one has standing in a Fourth Amendment claim, 
the person must prove he has a personal interest involved.  Id.  To establish that one has a 
personal interest, the person must prove both that an unreasonable search or seizure 
occurred and that he was personally victimized.  DRESSLER, supra note 39, § 20.01.  Thus, if 
something was unreasonably taken from X’s home that incriminates D and is introduced at 
D’s trial, D cannot attempt to suppress the evidence unless he can show that he was a 
victim of the unconstitutional activity.  Id.  This is true even though X could suppress it at 
his own trial.  Id.  In Fernandez-Roque, the Fourth Circuit held that it is not enough for the 
defendant to show that the prosecution utilized incriminating evidence against the 
defendant to establish a personal interest.  1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2716, at *2. 
122 Fernandez-Roque, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2716, at *2.  In this case, the police officer was 
in the defendant’s hotel room pursuant to a search warrant and answered the telephone.  
Id. at *1.  The defendant sought to suppress the evidence based on Fourth Amendment 
grounds, but the court held he had no Fourth Amendment rights because he was not a 
party to the conversation.  Id. at *2. 
123 Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).  Contradictory to most case precedent, 
a recent decision by the Washington Supreme Court found that the defendant’s expectation 
of privacy in a telephone call was reasonable.  State v. Christensen, 102 P.3d 789 (Wash. 
2004).  In that case, after being informed by the police that her daughter’s boyfriend was 
the suspect in a recent robbery, the mother listened in on a telephone conversation her 
daughter had with her boyfriend by employing the speakerphone function on the cordless 
phone’s console.  Id. at 791.  The daughter did not know her mother was listening because 
the daughter took the cordless phone up to her room and shut the door.  Id.  During the 
course of the conversation, the boyfriend admitted that he knew about the robbery, but he 
did not explicitly admit that he committed the robbery.  Id.  The mother testified to these 
statements, and the Washington Supreme Court held that the testimony was inadmissible.  
Id. at 796.  The court decided that it was irrelevant that the daughter knew her mother had 
listened in on conversations in the past because it was not concerned with the daughter’s 
expectation of privacy, but instead it was concerned with the defendant’s privacy.  Id. at 
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States v. White,124 the Supreme Court decided that only one party to the 
conversation must agree for a police officer to legally listen to or record 
the conversation.125  Similarly, the Kansas Court of Appeals deemed 
evidence obtained from a telephone conversation admissible because 
“any party to a private conversation may waive the right of privacy and 
the non-consenting party has no Fourth Amendment . . . right to 
challenge that waiver.”126   
Not only is it constitutional for officers to listen to telephone 
conversations, they can also answer the phone and engage in a 
conversation, even if the officer pretends to be someone else.127  This 
contention respects the Supreme Court decision that states that the test is 
whether the agent had probable cause to believe that the evidence will 
aid in the solution of the crime under investigation.128  The Fourth 
                                                                                                             
792.  Also, the mere possibility of intrusion is not enough to find that there is no 
expectation of privacy.  Id.  Finally, there is no minor exception when privacy interests are 
at risk.  Id. 
124 401 U.S. 745 (1971). 
125 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971).  The Supreme Court held that if an 
informant allows his conversations to be electronically monitored or recorded, no Fourth 
Amendment rights have been violated.  Id. 
126 State v. Roberts, 774 P.2d 378, *7–8 (Kan. Ct. App. June 2, 1989).  In this case, while 
officers were investigating an alleged assault, the defendant called the residence and asked 
to speak with Chrislip, who was the man he previously assaulted.  Id. at *2–3.  Instead of 
giving the phone to Chrislip, the phone was handed to the police officer who subsequently 
heard the defendant make threatening statements intended for Chrislip to hear.  Id.  When 
one decides to engage in a private conversation, he has the burden of making certain that 
he can trust the person with whom he is communicating.  Id. at *8.  Simply put, the court 
stated that “it is clear that defendant had no justifiable expectation of privacy when he 
placed the call . . . [and] the defendant was taking a risk that Chrislip would relay this 
conversation to the police or would cooperate with the police concerning the 
conversation.”  Id.  It is important to note that individual states can employ a more strict 
rule than the federal rule that only one party must consent for the police to listen to a 
telephone conversation.  Id. at *16. 
127 State v. Goucher, 881 P.2d 210, 213 (Wash. 1994).  In this case, officers were legally 
carrying out a search warrant when the phone rang.  Id. at 211.  The officer answered it, 
and the person on the other line asked for the homeowner.  Id.  The officer indicated that 
the homeowner was not there but that he was handling the homeowner’s business.  Id.  The 
caller asked for an eighth of cocaine, and the officer arranged for the sale.  Id.  When the 
caller came over to execute the drug deal, the officers arrested him.  Id. at 211–12.  The 
admission of the phone call into evidence was held constitutional because people do not 
have an expectation of privacy in strangers.  Id. at 213.  Also, the defendant claimed that the 
answering of the telephone violated the Fourth Amendment because it exceeded the scope 
of the warrant.  Id. at 215.  However, the court dismissed this argument because Fourth 
Amendment rights are personal and cannot be vicariously asserted.  Id. at 215–16. 
128 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 306 (1967)  (“[I]t is reasonable, within the terms of 
the Fourth Amendment, to conduct otherwise permissible searches for the purpose of 
obtaining evidence which would aid in apprehending and convicting criminals.”); see 
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Circuit established that it would be illogical to not allow an officer to 
answer a phone call during a search.129  As a result, most information 
voluntarily conveyed on the telephone is not afforded Fourth 
Amendment protection.130   
Third, it is acceptable for officers to obtain phone records without a 
warrant.131  The Sixth Circuit indicated that the type of information in 
“[t]hese records contain no information as to the persons participating in 
the call or the subject matter of the conversation,” and therefore it is not 
an interception of a message.132  Also, the Second Circuit concluded that 
                                                                                                             
United States v. Passarella, 788 F.2d 377, 381 (6th Cir. 1986) (“[O]nce lawfully present, the 
police may answer a ringing telephone.”); United States v. Ordonez, 737 F.2d 793, 810 (9th 
Cir. 1983) (stating that “the telephone is highly necessary to an unlawful organization 
selling cocaine out of private residences”); see also State v. Freeman, No. 10500, 1982 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 14437 (Ohio Ct. App. June 23, 1982).  In Freeman, the police officers were in the 
immediate pursuit of a person who had just committed a robbery.  Id. at *4.  They followed 
the person into the hotel in which he was staying.  Id.  The front desk phone rang and was 
answered by the receptionist, who told police that the caller asked for the person they were 
trying to find.  Id.  The police took the call, pretending to be the person they were pursuing, 
and they acquired further evidence about the matter.  Id. at *4–5.  Even though the police 
did not obtain a warrant, the court held that there was no violation of the Fourth 
Amendment because the police knew that the person was connected with the robbery and 
was registered at the hotel:  “[S]uch evidence has a nexus with the crime under 
investigation [and so] it may be seized.”  Id. at *9 (citing United States v. Kane, 450 F.2d 77 
(5th Cir. 1971)). 
129 United States v. Fernandez-Roque, No. 96-4351, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2716 (4th Cir. 
Feb. 14, 1997).  In fact, this practice is so common that it is reported freely in the media.  
One article reported that while the police were searching a home where drugs and money 
were found, the Vice Squad Sergeant was busy arranging drug deals on a cellular phone he 
found ringing in the couch.  Lee Hammel, Drugs Stings Score Big for Worchester Police; Seized 
Cellular Phone Key to Several Arrests, WORCESTER TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, Nov. 6, 2002, at A1, 
available at LEXIS, News, ALLNWS File.  Because they could not decipher the meeting 
codes that came into the phone, the officers were only able to arrest two of the seven people 
with whom they set up meetings.  Id. 
130 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (“This Court consistently has held that 
a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over 
to third parties.”). 
131 DiPiazza v. United States, 415 F.2d 99, 101 (6th Cir. 1969).  The numbers dialed from 
and received by a phone in association with an identified account is known as a “toll 
analysis.”  Figueroa v. State, 870 So. 2d 897, 899 (Fla. App. 2004).  “Subscriber information” 
is information such as the name, address, telephone number, type of service, and other 
similar information for the subscriber’s account.  Id. 
132 DiPiazza, 415 F.2d at 101.  The type of information contained in the records includes 
the date of the call, the destination of the call, the telephone number that was placed, the 
telephone number where the call originated, and the amount charged for the call.  Id.  In 
this case, the court did not suppress the telephone records obtained by the police to prove 
that the defendant partook in illegal gambling.  Id.  No person is able to reasonably assume 
that his making a call will remain a secret because just as the person on the other line may 
allow others to listen without violating the Fourth Amendment, so may a phone company 
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when people place calls, they know that the phone company must make 
some type of record of the conversation, and, consequently, they give 
consent for the company to make such a record.133  Because there is no 
interception and consent is given by the caller to create the record, 
obtaining phone records does not amount to a search and no Fourth 
Amendment protections are available.134   
The only Supreme Court case to date dealing with the Fourth 
Amendment and cellular phones is Bartnicki v. Vopper.135  Bartnicki dealt 
with other issues, such as the First Amendment, but it did note the 
principles pertaining to conventional telephones and applied them to 
cellular phones.136  The Court pointed out that “sophisticated (and not so 
sophisticated) methods of eavesdropping on oral conversations and 
                                                                                                             
turn over phone records without violating the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 103–04.  There is 
no government involvement, which is necessary to raise a Fourth Amendment question, 
when the government did not request the interception of the calls.  United States v. 
Villanueva, 32 F. Supp. 2d 635, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
133 United States v. Gallo, 123 F.2d 229, 231 (2d Cir. 1941).  Even if it is considered an 
interception, consent was given to intercept the call for this purpose, and the “reasonable 
business practice” of making a record of call is constitutional.  Id. 
134 Figueroa, 870 So. 2d at 899.  Because the caller voluntarily conveys this numeric 
information to the telephone company, there is no expectation of privacy, and the 
Constitution does not restrict access to it.  Id.  There is no search “unless the individual 
seeking to invoke the constitutional protection ‘manifested a subjective expectation of 
privacy’ in the subject matter of the challenged search, and ‘society [is] willing to recognize 
that expectation as reasonable.’”  Id. at 899 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 
(2001)). 
135 532 U.S. 514, 541 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia 
asserted: 
Technology now permits millions of important and confidential 
conversations to occur through a vast system of electronic networks. 
These advances, however, raise significant privacy concerns. We are 
placed in the uncomfortable position of not knowing who might have 
access to our personal and business e-mails, our medical and financial 
records, or our cordless and cellular telephone conversations. 
Id.  In this case, a union was engaged in negotiations, and the chief negotiator for the union 
was Bartnicki.  Id. at 518.  Kane, president of the union, allowed Bartnicki to use her cellular 
phone to have a lengthy conversation regarding the negotiations, including plans to strike.  
Id.  This conversation was intercepted by an unknown party, turned over to a radio station, 
and aired.  Id. at 519. 
136 Id.  The Court ultimately held that first, the interests of “removing an incentive for 
parties to intercept private conversations, and second, the interest in minimizing the harm 
to persons whose conversations have been illegally intercepted” did not outweigh the First 
Amendment restrictions on speech with the press.  Id. at 529. 
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intercepting telephone calls have been practiced for decades, primarily 
by law enforcement authorities.”137   
By examining case law, it becomes obvious that most actions 
undertaken by police officers regarding telephones are upheld as 
constitutional.138  The police can listen to or engage in a telephone 
conversation as well as obtain phone records.  As devices advance, the 
amount of retrievable information increases, and privacy concerns are 
maximized.  Accordingly, case law concerning pieces of technology with 
more capabilities becomes more complex.139   
                                                 
137 Id. at 522.  There is no expectation of privacy in audible messages on an answering 
machine.  United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1011 (9th Cir. 1983).  Also, there is no 
expectation of privacy in a cassette tape.  United States v. Bonfiglio, 713 F.2d 932, 937 (2d 
Cir. 1983). 
138 United States v. Passarella, 788 F.2d 377, 380 (6th Cir. 1986) (“Every federal and state 
court which has addressed facts similar to those here has also concluded that an agent’s 
conduct in answering a telephone while lawfully on the premises is not violative of the 
Fourth Amendment.”); see also United States v. Congote, 656 F.2d 971, 976 (5th Cir. 1981). 
139 The pager is an example of a device that has advanced over time and correspondingly 
received different treatment from the courts.  Some pagers are less advanced and can only 
receive incoming numbers, but others are more advanced and allow the incoming caller to 
have options, including the opportunity to send his own message.  Figueroa v. State, 870 
So. 2d 897, 899 (Fl. App. 2004).  In general, people have less of an expectation of privacy 
with pagers than with telephones because with a telephone, the caller can hear the voice 
and decide if he wants to converse.  United States v. Meriwether, 917 F.2d 955, 959 (6th Cir. 
1990).  However, with a pager, the sender has no idea who possesses the pager or to whom 
the message will be shown.  Id.  Because there is generally no expectation of privacy 
regarding pagers, there is typically no protection granted by the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 
959.  Consequently, the Fourth Amendment usually cannot be violated when obtaining 
information from pagers.  Id.  For some courts, the analysis depends upon the pager’s 
capabilities.  Figueroa, 870 So. 2d at 901.  Pagers that only have the capacity to indicate the 
number of the incoming caller have been treated in a similar way to telephone records 
because with both, the caller has no control over the numbers being sent and displayed.  
Meriwether, 917 F.2d at 958.  The Sixth Circuit stated that it is within the scope of a warrant 
authorizing the seizure of phone numbers for the officer to record numbers displayed on a 
pager because the officer can seize the numbers, regardless of their form.  Id.  The digital 
display pager has been termed a “contemporary receptacle for telephone numbers,” and 
the court even decided that a pager that originally was turned off can be activated by the 
police because “[t]he later, off-the-premises activation of the pager to obtain [Meriwether’s] 
number is no more intrusive than the later, off-the-premises opening of a personal 
telephone book to obtain what might be incriminating evidence.”  Id.  More advanced 
pagers allow the caller to have control over what numbers appear on the display, and 
courts disagree over whether this capability necessitates a different analysis.  Id.  For 
example, some pagers allow the caller to type in a message or code following the number 
that appears, or to even type in a number that may not reflect the location of the caller.  Id.  
In a Florida Supreme Court case, the officers monitored the display on a pager without first 
obtaining a warrant.  State v. Jackson, 650 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1995).  The numbers intercepted 
included a two-to-three digit code that would identify the caller, the caller’s telephone 
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2. Computers 
Computers are more advanced than conventional telephones 
because they have storage capacity and thus have an elevated 
probability of conveying intimate details.  Technology that contains a 
high level of individual activity is afforded a high level of protection.140  
Two clear analogies to computers have emerged:  closed containers and 
file cabinets.141  
First, the Fourth Circuit has recognized that closed containers, such 
as lockers, briefcases, and pieces of luggage, are given a correspondingly 
high amount of protection as a result of people’s high expectations of 
privacy with them.142  A warrant should be sought before looking into 
the container, but once authority is granted to look into the container, the 
                                                                                                             
number, and the amount of drugs the caller wanted to purchase.  Id. at 25–26.  As a result 
of these complex pagers, the Florida Supreme Court held that different results would arise 
depending on whether the caller had control over the number or message sent because 
when the caller has control, the message sent is a communication and the sender has a 
subjective expectation of privacy.  Id. at 26.  The court held that the owner of a pager may 
have a subjective expectation of privacy regarding the content of the messages being sent, 
but the owner may not have a subjective expectation of privacy regarding the actual 
numbers received by the pager that are recorded by the phone company.  Id.  However, the 
Sixth Circuit refused to follow this logic, holding that a person has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy when sending a message to a pager, no matter how much control the 
sender has over what is sent.  Meriwether, 917 F.2d at 959.  The reason that the sender has 
no expectation of privacy is because the sender has no way of determining who is in 
possession of the pager and thus has no reason to believe that the owner has it or will keep 
it private.  Id.  Agreeing with the Sixth Circuit’s judgment, the California Court of Appeals 
determined that even the highly advanced pagers that allow for a ten-second recording are 
afforded no Fourth Amendment protection because no conversation occurs.  State v. 
Medina, 189 Cal. App. 3d 39 (1987). 
140 Winick, supra note 82, at 81.  A home computer that has a mere 100-megabyte storage 
capacity limit can hold more than over 100,000 typewritten pages of information.  Id. 
141 See infra notes 141–50 and accompanying text.  For the sake of discussion, it is also 
important to note that computers are not being compared to sealed containers, which 
require force to open.  United States v. Al-Marri, 230 F. Supp. 2d 535, 541 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002).  This distinction is important because with sealed documents, it has been held that if 
it is necessary to break or damage the property to open it, it may not fall under the scope of 
a general consent.  Id.  The court held that because documents can be copied from a 
computer with no damage to the computer, it does not compare to the sealed container 
analogy.  Id. 
142 United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 1978).  The court calls for the officers 
to consider the “common experience of life” to determine whether people reasonably had 
an expectation of privacy in regards to the closed container.  Id.  Not every closed 
container, such as pants pockets, can be afforded such protection, but containers in which 
people truly have an expectation of privacy must be afforded protection.  Id. at 541 n.8. 
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police are not limited in what they can search.143  They are not limited 
because it is relatively easy to determine if pieces of incriminating 
evidence, such as weapons or drugs, are present when rummaging 
through a closed container.144  Closed containers are compared to 
computers because they must be opened and they contain private 
information.145 
Second, computers are compared to file cabinets because they 
contain an intermingling of relevant and irrelevant material.146  The 
contents of many file cabinets are like the contents of a computer hard 
drive.147  Both a file cabinet and a computer typically have an 
organizational system and contain a vast amount of information.148   
                                                 
143 Resseguie, supra note 67, at 188.  The analysis then goes back to the concerns raised in 
Hayden because a defendant typically claims that incriminating items seized while 
performing a search for evidence of another crime should be suppressed because it is 
irrelevant to the current charge.  Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 (1976). 
144 Andresen, 427 U.S. at 482 n.11 (stating that “a warrant to search for physical objects 
whose relevance is more easily ascertainable” is simpler to justify). 
145 Resseguie, supra note 67, at 213. 
146 United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 583 (D. Vt. 1998).  It is important to note 
that though the file cabinet analogy has been cited in cases, the predominant method is to 
use the closed container analogy.  Resseguie, supra note 67, at 213; see United States v. Al-
Marri, 230 F. Supp. 2d 535, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Courts have uniformly agreed that 
computers should be treated as if they were closed containers.”). 
147 Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 410 (4th Cir. 2001).  Another element for discussion is 
that relevant material may exist on a computer and may be in “plain view” when the 
officers are performing a search.  See supra note 67 for a discussion on the Plain View 
Doctrine.  For the Plain View Doctrine to apply to computers, the computer must 
“prominently display the evidence of crime” without any interference from authorities, 
and it requires a new warrant upon finding evidence of a crime outside the scope of the 
warrant already obtained.  Resseguie, supra note 67, at 197.  When lawfully searching 
computers, it has been held that police do not have to disregard file names that suggest 
evidence of criminal activity.  Bohn, Jr. & Muster, supra note 50, at 65 (citing 
Commonwealth v. Viriyahiranpaiboon, 588 N.E.2d 643, 647 (Mass. 1992)).  Also, when 
someone surrenders his computer to another, his expectations of privacy are lowered 
because he voluntarily turned the computer and its contents to another for viewing.  
Andresen, 427 U.S. at 482 n.11.  A successful application of the Plain View Doctrine is where 
the police were executing a search warrant looking for evidence of gambling when the 
words “advanced, declined, unchanged” appeared on the computer screen.  City of Akron 
v. Patrick, No. 10428, 1982 Ohio App. LEXIS 11472, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. June 16, 1982).  
These words were ones the officer knew to be commonly used in a gambling game 
regarding stock quotations.  Id.  The court upheld the seizing of the computer because the 
words were in plain view and the officers were legally in the apartment.  Id. at *5–8.  The 
Plain View Doctrine does not apply to closed computer files on a hard drive and does not 
allow extensions of general exploratory searches.  Resseguie, supra note 67, at 197.  The 
slight moving of a stereo to read its serial number was enough to not allow the Plain View 
Doctrine to be invoked.  Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987).  Thus, in a situation where 
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When looking at how much Fourth Amendment protection a piece 
of technology receives, a major factor to consider is the technological 
capabilities the device possesses.149  With conventionally low-
technological items, such as telephones, becoming more advanced, 
courts should consider the most advanced device when determining 
how to fairly apply current law.150  The lack of a practical test exemplifies 
that current standards are outdated and illogical, and as technology 
quickly advances, courts struggle to keep its standards applicable, and 
the time has come to re-examine them.151   
III.  THE FAILING FOURTH AMENDMENT PRECEDENT 
The focus of Fourth Amendment precedent is its protection from 
government intrusion.152  In an attempt to ensure that result, the Katz test 
has emerged, which provides a two-prong test to find whether Fourth 
Amendment protection is warranted.153  The text of the Fourth 
                                                                                                             
the police randomly open computer files, there is too much affirmative police action and 
the Plain View Doctrine will not be applicable.  See id. 
148 Trulock, 275 F.3d at 410.  Further continuing the explanation of the Plain View 
Doctrine with computers requires the realization that the Plain View Doctrine is 
abundantly used with child pornography on computers.  DRESSLER, supra note 39, § 15.  
There are countless cases where a person took his computer to be repaired and the 
repairman found evidence of child pornography on the computer and called police.  
United States v. Caron, No. 03-79-P-H, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3663 (D. Me. Mar. 9, 2004).  
Yet, the Plain View Doctrine has limitations when applied to computers.  The First Circuit 
determined that an image coming into view on a computer is not necessarily enough to 
authorize an expansion of the search.  United States v. Turner, 169 F.3d 84 (1st Cir. 1999).  
In Turner, a man allowed the police to search his home for evidence of an assault on his 
neighbor, and, while doing so, an image of a nude woman, who was physically similar to 
his neighbor, appeared on the computer.  Id. at 86. The court held that the image appearing 
on the computer did not authorize the officer to begin searching the contents of the 
computer without first obtaining a warrant.  Id.  Similarly, the Tenth Circuit decided that 
when a warrant specifically states that the police are to look for evidence of names or 
addresses, they should not begin looking in image or graphics files in computers.  United 
States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1272–73 (10th Cir. 1999).  In United States v. Carey, police 
were searching for evidence of drug activity on a computer when the detective discovered 
a file containing child pornography.  Id. at 1271.  He abandoned his search for the drug 
activity and began looking for more evidence of child pornography without first obtaining 
a warrant.  Id.  The court held that he unconstitutionally went beyond the scope of the 
warrant, finding that the pornographic images were in “closed files” and thus “not in plain 
view” of the officer, and ultimately suppressing the evidence.  Id. at 1273, 1276. 
149 See supra Part II.D. 
150 See infra Part III.B. 
151 See infra Part III. 
152 See supra Part II.A. 
153 See supra Part II.C.  The test came from the ruling in Katz v. United States.  389 U.S. 347 
(1967).  Both prongs hinge on the determination of what a reasonable expectation of 
privacy is for that particular case.  Id. 
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Amendment articulates some of the applicable principles, and other 
principles are interpreted from court precedent.154  Those principles 
based on the text of the Fourth Amendment include the Reasonableness 
Clause, which provides exactly what the Fourth Amendment covers, and 
the Warrant Clause, which supplies the probable cause and particularity 
requirements.155  A search is defined as a meaningful interference with a 
person’s possessory interest, and a seizure is defined through the Katz 
test, which has both a subjective and objective prong.156  Together, all of 
these ideas formulate the current significant standards of privacy 
protection.   
Though the elements of the Fourth Amendment seem clear, its 
application is confusing.  There are two considerable problems with the 
Fourth Amendment’s principles that render them obsolete.  First, when 
applying it to cellular phones, the Katz test is impractical and 
outdated.157  The courts have explicitly stated that the subjective prong is 
unhelpful, and the objective prong is too flexible.158  Illogically, this test 
remains the standard of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding 
technological devices, including cellular phones.159  Second, the closed 
container analogy that is used with computers is too simplistic to apply 
to cellular phones, and the analogy that should be used, the file cabinet 
approach, is not being applied effectively.160   
A. The Impractical Katz Test 
The Katz test has a subjective prong that is based on an individual’s 
belief and an objective prong that is based on society’s recognition of 
what is reasonable.161  Yet, when applying these standards, the 
practicalities of both the subjective and objective prongs crumble for two 
reasons.  First, courts determine whether a search occurs on a case-by-
                                                 
154 See supra Parts II.B, II.D. 
155 See supra Part II.B. 
156 See supra Part II.C. 
157 See infra Part III.A. 
158 See infra Part III.A. 
159 See infra Part III.A. 
160 See infra Part III.B. 
161 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Douglas, Brennan, JJ., concurring).  The 
Supreme Court directly asserted that the Fourth Amendment does not protect items that 
were exposed to the public, but it does protect items that a person sought to keep 
protected, even if it is accessible to the public.  Id. at 361–62.  The Court provided this 
standard because if people seek to protect items, they have a reasonable subjective and 
objective expectation of privacy.  Id.  However, if information is exposed to the public, even 
though a person may have a subjective expectation of privacy, the objective expectation of 
privacy cannot be met because it is unreasonable.  Id. at 351–52. 
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case basis, making it challenging to predict what the courts will rule in 
each instance.162  Second, based on the outcomes of prior cases, courts 
“value[] crime control over individual privacy.”163  It appears that the 
discretion given to the courts in determining the subjective and objective 
expectations of privacy has provided them with the opportunity to deny 
Fourth Amendment protection.164  The Katz test should not be applied to 
cellular phones, as there are clear problems with both the subjective and 
objective prongs. 
The subjective prong of the Katz test has been inconsistently applied, 
dismissed as useless, ignored, and explicitly termed ineffective.165  By 
casually dismissing the subjective prong with no explanation, the 
Supreme Court implicitly confirmed that it does not find it necessary to 
scrutinize the subjective prong when executing a privacy analysis.166  
There are even holdings in which the Court basically ignored the 
subjective prong altogether by automatically determining that there was 
a subjective expectation of privacy, without any explanation, forging into 
a discussion of the objective prong.167   
Also, the Supreme Court went beyond ignoring the Fourth 
Amendment by announcing that no person ever has a subjective 
expectation of privacy.168  In Smith v. Maryland,169 the Supreme Court 
declared that it “doubt[ed] that people in general entertain any actual 
                                                 
162 See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 718 (1987) (“[T]he question whether an 
[individual] has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case 
basis.”); Cressman v. Ellis, 77 Fed. Appx. 744, 746 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[S]uch privacy 
expectations must be evaluated on a case by case basis.”); United States v. King, 227 F.3d 
732, 744 (6th Cir. 2000) (“Whether a legitimate expectation of privacy exists in a particular 
place or item is a determination to be made on a case-by-case basis.”); see also United States 
v. Brown, 635 F.2d 1207, 1211 (6th Cir. 1980). 
163 Sergent, supra note 71, at 1193. 
164 Id. 
165 See infra Part III.A. 
166 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47j v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995) (stating that “[t]he Fourth 
Amendment does not protect all subjective expectations of privacy, but only those that 
society recognizes as ‘legitimate,’” and illustrating that it does not matter what the 
subjective prong determines, all that matters is the objective prong); see also United States v. 
White, 401 U.S. 751–52 (1971) (concluding that most people do not think the people with 
whom they converse will go to the police with the information they disclose, or else the 
individual never would have disclosed it). 
167 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (stating only that the subjective idea of 
privacy could not determine the constitutional outcome). 
168 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979). 
169 Id. 
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expectation of privacy.”170  Not only does this statement show that the 
Court concluded that no one has a real expectation of privacy in that 
instance, but this statement also defines the subjective prong with the 
exact language used to define the objective prong.171  The determination 
of what “people in general” would expect is exactly what the objective 
prong considers.172  Thus, the Supreme Court bases the subjective 
expectation of privacy on what the “people in general” do, and so the 
subjective and objective prongs are virtually identical.173  Deciding the 
expectation of the “people in general” twice, once in the subjective prong 
analysis and once in the objective prong analysis, is redundant.174  Justice 
John Harlan decided that a person’s subjective expectation of privacy is 
really determined by the current objective expectation of privacy.175   
In addition to the courts’ inconsistent holdings and virtual disregard 
for the subjective prong, some courts have explicitly declared that the 
subjective prong is irrelevant in Fourth Amendment privacy analysis.176  
Though the subjective standard is still good law, the Supreme Court has 
gone as far as to assert that the subjective prong “obviously could play 
no meaningful role” in privacy analysis when expectations can be 
“‘conditioned’ by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth 
                                                 
170 Id. at 742.  This case dealt with the subjective expectation of privacy in telephone 
numbers.  Id.  The Court stated that in reference to expectations conditioned by influences 
foreign to common Fourth Amendment concepts “those subjective expectations obviously 
could play no meaningful role in ascertaining what the scope of Fourth Amendment 
protection was.”  Id. at 741 n.5. 
171 See supra Part II.C.2. 
172 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he only thing 
the past three decades have established about the Katz test . . . is that, unsurprisingly, those 
‘actual [subjective] expectation[s] of privacy’ ‘that society is prepared to recognize as 
“reasonable”’ bear an uncanny resemblance to those expectations of privacy that this Court 
considers reasonable.”). 
173 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979). 
174 John M. Junker, The Structure of the Fourth Amendment:  The Scope of the Protection, 79 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1105, 1147–48 (1989). 
175 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  Justice Harlan 
declared that in privacy analysis, the “search for subjective expectations” should be 
“transcend[ed]” because “[o]ur expectations . . .  are . . . reflections of laws that translate 
into rules the customs and values of the past and present.”  Id.  Interestingly, Justice Harlan 
was one of the Justices that agreed with the majority in Katz.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 347 (1967). 
176 White, 401 U.S. at 781 n.16 (“[T]he Court emphasized the importance of ‘an objective 
predetermination’ uncomplicated by a presentation not ‘subtly influenced by the familiar 
shortcomings of hindsight judgment.’”). 
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Amendment freedoms.”177  The fact that this prong still exists when the 
Supreme Court has implicitly determined it moot is irrational.178   
Similar to the subjective prong, the objective prong is difficult to 
apply to technology because of its lack of clarity and indeterminate 
standards.179  First, it is not clear by whose standards the “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” is to be judged.180  It is impractical for a court to 
take a national survey every time it has to decide a Fourth Amendment 
privacy issue, and the Supreme Court has never attempted to use 
scientific literature or tests to determine a true objective expectation of 
privacy.181  Due to practicality, it appears that the reasonableness is not 
determined by an objective opinion of the “people in general,” but is 
determined by the judge.182  Conceivably, Fourth Amendment 
determinations turn on the judge’s technological inclinations.   
Second, the objective expectation of the privacy prong proclaims that 
reasonableness is based on the expectation that “society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable.”183  As explained above, “[o]ur expectations . . . 
are . . . reflections of laws that translate into rules [consisting of] the 
customs and values of the past and present.”184  The objective 
expectation is constantly changing with every new law approved and 
                                                 
177 Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 n.5.  The Court gave specific examples of when there could be 
no subjective expectation of privacy.  Id.  “[I]f the Government were suddenly to announce 
on nationwide television that all homes . . . would be subject to warrantless entry, 
individuals thereafter might not . . . entertain any actual expectation or privacy regarding 
their homes, papers, and effects.”  Id.  The Court gave another example of “a refugee from a 
totalitarian country” whose government previously monitored all of his telephone 
conversations.  Id.  If that refugee came to the United States and was uninformed about the 
policies and practices of this nation, he understandably would assume that because his 
telephone conversations were recorded in his country, they would be recorded by this 
government as well.  Id.  Therefore, he would not a have a subjective expectation of privacy 
regarding his telephone conversations.  Id. 
178 Id.  The Court acknowledged that “[s]ituations can be imagined, of course, in which 
Katz’ two-pronged inquiry would provide an inadequate index of Fourth Amendment 
protection.”  Id. 
179 DRESSLER, supra note 39, § 7.03. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998).  Justice Scalia stated that “expectation[s] of 
privacy . . . bear an uncanny resemblance to those expectations of privacy that this Court 
considers reasonable.”  Id. 
183 See supra Part II.C. 
184 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  “[R]egulatory 
policy may be based upon existing cultural preferences and the level of technological 
development, and vice versa.”  Banks, supra note 3, at 591. 
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every new piece of technology created.185  Therefore, with this constant 
change in attitudes and expectations in technology comes a 
correspondingly varying Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that makes 
predicting outcomes virtually impossible.186  When it lacks uniformity, 
the law becomes unpredictable and people lose confidence in it.187  
Society’s view of reasonableness is appropriate in many instances, but it 
is not appropriate with computers and cellular phones because 
technology changes too rapidly and many people are limited in their 
knowledge—reasonableness cannot be the standard when determining 
the privacy interest involved with technology.188   
Thus, the Katz test is impractical to apply to technology because the 
subjective and objective prongs are outdated and unable to provide a 
concrete rule of law.189  The contradictory foundation of cellular phone 
precedent is inadequate and a new foundation must be laid.190  However, 
for any rule to be effective, it cannot simply exist, it must also be 
followed.   
B. Choosing the Correct Analogy for Cellular Phones 
For a rule to be effective, it not only has to work in the present, it also 
must have the capability to remain updated and apply in the future.  The 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment and 
technology, including the Katz test and the closed container analogy, is 
archaic, and a new standard must be established.   
Clear and accurate analogies to computers are essential because 
these analogies affect the precedent of all types of technology.  
Computers have been compared to closed containers and file cabinets.  
They resemble closed containers, which include lockers, briefcases, and 
luggage, because people have a high expectation of privacy with all of 
these items.191  They likewise are compared to file cabinets because they 
                                                 
185 DRESSLER, supra note 39, § 7.03.  “The detriment of this approach is that the law may 
end up mirroring current attitudes, which have themselves been conditioned by prior 
incursions authorized by the courts, rather than projecting a twenty-first view of the proper 
relationship between the government and citizenry.”  Id. 
186 Id. 
187 Veronica M. Dougherty, Absurdity and the Limits of Liberalism:  The Absurd Result 
Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 44 AM. U.L. REV. 127, 133 n.26 (1994) (citing Antonin 
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989)). 
188 Raymond Nimmer & Patricia A. Krauthaus, Copyright and Software Technology 
Infringement:  Defining Third Party Development Rights, 62 IND. L.J. 13, 22 (1986). 
189 See supra Part III.A. 
190 See infra Part IV. 
191 See supra Part II.D. 
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hold a large amount of information in an organized manner.192  
Currently, cellular phones have the same capabilities as computers, 
possessing the capacity to perform duties that go far beyond simply 
sending and receiving phone calls.193  With a cellular phone, a person can 
send emails and text messages, take pictures, save files, and create phone 
books.  As technology advances, the capabilities and characteristics that 
previously allowed a computer to demand more privacy are now 
available in cellular phones as well.194  Hence, computers and cellular 
phones must be judged according to the same standards.   
Due to the development of modern technology, cellular phones and 
computers are closely related.  Consequently, the same standards should 
be applied to both devices.195  However, the analysis should not end 
there because the current standards utilized to analyze computers are 
not appropriate for either form of technology.196  In fact, the principle 
                                                 
192 See supra Part II.D. 
193 Banks, supra note 3, at 586–87.  People can use a cellular phone to “communicate by 
voice, . . . access phone mail, voice mail, stock prices, sports scores, and even restaurant 
reviews.”  Id. at 586. 
194 Id. at 586–87. 
195 In fact, some courts have realized how related cellular phones and computers are and 
have applied the closed container approach to cellular phones.  United States v. Villanueva, 
32 F. Supp. 2d 635, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).  In Villanueva, the court held that because the 
officers made a vehicular stop, they could “examine the contents of any container found 
therein.”  Id.  In this instance, the court was referring to a cellular phone.  Id. 
196 Another area of concern weighing heavily on searches and seizures of technology is 
the inadequate training police receive to perform the searches.  United States v. Hunter, 13 
F. Supp. 2d 574, 583 (D. Vt. 1998).  Courts have acknowledged that part of the reason that 
on-site searches of technological devices are not practical is because law enforcement 
expertise will not allow it.  Id.  Sometimes, with little guidance, police begin to perform 
searches on files when many of them do not even know what distinguishes a text file from 
an image file.  United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 1999).  Police officers 
that have insufficient knowledge of computers will most likely conduct overbroad 
searches.  Resseguie, supra note 67, at 195.  The government either needs to train the officers 
on computers or allow experts to do it.  Id.  However, even though they may not possess a 
strong technological understanding, because the police are the people with in-depth and 
practical knowledge of the Fourth Amendment, the answer cannot be to completely 
eliminate them from the process.  Id.  However, some courts shockingly have held that 
police participation in technological searches is bothersome.  United States v. Bach, 310 
F.3d 1063, 1066 (8th Cir. 2002).  “The Fourth Amendment does not explicitly require official 
presence during a warrant’s execution, therefore it is not an automatic violation if no officer 
is present during a search.”  Id. at 1066–67.  The court finally stated that the presence of a 
police officer “may have hindered” the search and consequently held that the search not 
out of the presence of an officer was constitutional.  Id. at 1067.  Preventing the presence of 
police officers during searches is illogical because the officers are a part of the safeguard 
that is promised to citizens, and these are the people most likely to know the intricacies of 
Fourth Amendment protection.  Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:  
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most widely applied to computers, the closed container approach, has 
several defects.197   
The first problem is that the closed container approach allows 
overbroad searches.198  The established precedent with closed containers 
is that once the warrant is obtained, the police have authority to look 
through and search the entire container.199  However, when dealing with 
physical documents, courts invalidated warrants that merely 
acknowledged they were to search for “all documents in paper form” 
because this type of searching was deemed dangerous.200  In keeping 
with the analogy of closed containers, the effect of comparing cellular 
phones to computers is to allow a search of “all information stored on 
[the] computer.”201  It is impractical to allow technology to be compared 
                                                                                                             
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 878 (2004).  Kerr 
reasons: 
In a search of physical property, an untrained person would be likely 
to destroy more property and invade more privacy than a trained 
officer. Applying this rationale to a search of a computer, the court 
reasoned that an officer’s physical presence was required to protect 
privacy and comply with the Fourth Amendment. 
Id. 
197 See infra Part III.B. 
198 United States v. Villanueva, 32 F. Supp. 2d 635, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating that the 
common way to talk about searches with a closed container is to say they can look at the 
“entire container”). 
199 Id.  “We recognize that there are grave dangers inherent in executing a warrant 
authorizing a search and seizure of a person’s papers that are not necessarily present in 
executing a warrant to search for physical objects whose relevance is more easily 
ascertainable.”  Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976). 
200 Andresen, 427 U.S. at 482 n.11.  The Second Circuit also determined that an 
investigation aimed at “the contents of all three file cabinets” was overly broad because 
there needs to be some direction as to the category of documents that the cabinet may 
contain.  In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1973).  The Court pointed out that it is 
easier to determine if a physical object is within the limits of a warrant because it is obvious 
when you look at it.  Andresen, 427 U.S. at 482 n.11.  In order to determine if a document is 
relevant, a person must first read the document, and inevitably some information will be 
discovered that was not intended to be searched.  Id.  The Court also noted the same 
inherent danger in listening to telephone conversations, finding that one must first listen to 
at least a part of the conversation to discover if it is relevant.  Id. 
201 Winick, supra note 82, at 110.  The closed container analogy has been used by the 
Tenth Circuit to uphold the seizure of a computer, videos, diskettes, and documents when 
searching for evidence of child pornography.  United States v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241 (10th 
Cir. 1998).  The court held that once the warrant was issued to allow for the search of child 
pornography files, the computer and any components are within the scope of the warrant, 
effectively allowing for an exploratory search.  Id. at 1248.  This is much like what happens 
in a closed container search.  Winick, supra note 82, at 110.  The object itself, the container, is 
given much protection because there is a high expectation of privacy, but once the warrant 
is issued, there appears to be no limit to the search, which is dangerous, especially when 
dealing with the contents of computers.  Id.  The courts are also willing to uphold the 
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to a closed container because this would give the police, upon obtaining 
a warrant, the ability and authority to search freely throughout the entire 
contents of a cellular phone.202   
The second problem with the closed container approach is that both 
computers and cellular phones do not properly fit in the category.  Items 
typically characterized as closed containers are lockers, briefcases, and 
pieces of luggage.203  It is a great leap to claim that a cellular phone is in 
the same league as those items typically associated with closed 
containers because cellular phones have many more capabilities.204  The 
key to finding a rational principle is to acknowledge that there are two 
different interests at stake with technological devices:  (1) the interest in 
the physical device and other media used to store information and (2) 
the interest in the actual informational contents.205  There are several 
substantial differences between closed containers and cellular phones.  
First, cellular phones have the potential to hold a vast amount of 
information, whereas closed containers are not as extensively inclined.  
Second, many closed containers cannot physically be searched in a police 
station because they are heavy or affixed to their locations.  Yet, 
something as small and light as a cellular phone can easily be searched in 
another location if circumstances render it absolutely necessary.  Third, 
closed containers have not advanced significantly over the years but 
cellular phones have.  Closed containers may have stronger locks than 
                                                                                                             
closed container approach when a description of the documents is impossible.  United 
States v. Musson, 650 F. Supp. 525, 532 (D. Colo. 1986).  Due to the difficulty in describing 
all files associated with transactions of a company, the District of Colorado held that police 
could seize the entire computer and allowed the seizure of a large volume of intermingled 
documents.  Id.  Nonetheless, the closed container analogy, when applied to computers 
allowing the police to look at anything within the computer, is “too simplistic and allows 
for search and seizure of computer [sic] to proceed in a very intrusive manner and should 
be abandoned.”  Resseguie, supra note 67, at 213.  The District of Maine stated that a 
warrant “could not authorize the seizure of every text document and every digital image, 
no matter how innocent.”  United States v. Clough, 246 F. Supp. 2d 84, 87–88 (D. Me. 2003); 
see also United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 583 (D. Vt. 1998).  In Clough, the court 
held that a description in a warrant calling for the seizure of “all computers, computer 
related components[,] and other digital storage devices” lacked sufficient limitation 
because such catchall phrases are too broad.  246 F. Supp. 2d at 88 n.3. 
202 Winick, supra note 82, at 111.  Application of the closed container analogy “ignores the 
reality of modern computer use and allows officers to gain a window into all aspects of a 
suspect’s life merely because the officers suspect that one piece of relevant information may 
be stored on a computer.”  Id. 
203 See supra Part II.D.3. 
204 These capabilities provide readily available intimate details that are easily conveyed.  
See supra Part I. 
205 Bohn, Jr. & Muster, supra note 50, at 65. 
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ever before, but this slight advancement is not comparable to the 
substantial developments with cellular phones.   
The third problem with the closed container analogy concerns the 
timing of when the expectation of privacy is lost.206  According to closed 
container precedent, the expectation of privacy is automatically lost if a 
person abandons or disclaims interest in the property.207  Applying this 
idea to conventional telephones, which typically cannot save 
information, is understandable because with conventional telephones, 
once the information is supplied to third parties, the individual’s privacy 
interest deteriorates to the point that he is no longer provided Fourth 
Amendment protection.208  In these instances, the person loses his 
expectation of privacy because the information was in his control and he 
voluntarily turned the information over to others.209  However, the 
voluntary handing over of information does not occur when a police 
officer rummages through a cellular phone without the consent of its 
owner. 
Based on the principles applied to telephones, once a person 
provides information to another, his expectation of privacy should 
diminish.210  Conversely, if the person does not voluntarily provide the 
information, the expectation of privacy is not lost.  Cellular phones, 
which have as much potential as a computer, should be afforded more 
protection than what the closed container analogy provides.211  Because 
computers, and ultimately cellular phones, are analogized 
inappropriately as closed containers, the police are allowed to delve into 
many other areas that go beyond the communication, into an “unlimited 
intrusion into the contents of a computer’s storage without a showing of 
relevance.”212  The closed container approach may work for lockers, 
briefcases, and pieces of luggage, but this approach cannot be applied 
appropriately to cellular phones because they have the capabilities of a 
conventional telephone and they resemble computers.  Therefore, the file 
cabinet approach should be applied.   
The file cabinet approach is a more appropriate analogy than the 
closed container approach when considering both computers and 
                                                 
206 Resseguie, supra note 67, at 189. 
207 Id. 
208 See supra Part II.D. 
209 See supra Part II.D. 
210 Resseguie, supra note 67, at 189. 
211 Banks, supra note 3, at 585–88. 
212 Resseguie, supra note 67, at 212. 
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cellular phones.  According to the file cabinet approach, computers are 
compared to file cabinets because they both contain a high amount of 
information in an organized fashion.213  Based on precedent with this 
analogy, police are not allowed to take an entire file cabinet from an 
office, reasoning that such a seizure is overbroad and cumbersome.214  
Thus, police are forced to sort through the volumes of documents on site, 
separating relevant information from irrelevant information.215  By 
keeping the file cabinet on site, the owner is still able to access important 
documents, allowing the company to continue its normal operations and 
minimizing the effects of a possible Fourth Amendment violation.   
The contents of many file cabinets are similar to the contents of a 
computer hard drive.216  Thus, the courts should follow file cabinet 
precedent and not allow computers to be taken off site to another 
location.  Nonetheless, that standard is not reflected in case precedent 
because it is more convenient for the police to take them off site; 
consequently, due to convenience, computers are often removed from 
the office even though the searches allowed on computers, such as 
keyword searches, are less time consuming than manual searches 
through file cabinets.217   
                                                 
213 Id. at 213. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. (citing In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 79–80 (2d Cir. 1973) (indicating that subpoenas 
should not be directed at whole file cabinets but at categories of documents)). 
216 Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 410 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he differences between 
computer files and physical repositories . . . are legally insignificant.  Courts . . . apply 
established Fourth Amendment principles to computers and computer files, often drawing 
analogies between computers and physical storage units such as file cabinets and closed 
containers.”). 
217 Resseguie, supra note 67, at 213.  Even though the warrant is meant to limit the officers 
in their searches, including searches of technological devices, it is extremely tempting to do 
a general, exploratory search.  Bohn, Jr. & Muster, supra note 50, at 76–77. Instead of 
rummaging around aimlessly, specific methods should be used by officers to get at the 
information quickly, such as keyword searches, temporal delineations, or examination of a 
printout that contains all of the filenames.  Id. at 76.  The keyword search typically is 
considered the best option because if the term searched for is anywhere within the 
computer, it will be found and pulled up.  Id. at 77.  Nevertheless, there are major 
limitations to keyword searches.  Id.  Just as easily as a drug dealer can call his files 
something besides “cocaine.doc,” he can also come up with code words as a way of 
referring to the items tracked on a document within the computer.  Id.  Another drawback 
is that a person can never be sure to have found everything.  Id.  Because not one method is 
guaranteed to work, police are not currently limited to using only one method, and the lack 
of a specific method unfortunately brings one full-circle, back to the ever-tempting 
possibility of exploratory searches.  Id. at 76. 
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Even though it may be convenient for police to take computers off 
site, it is terribly inconvenient for the company or person whose 
computer is taken.218  Many businesses and individuals rely on 
computers for daily functions and not having them could drastically 
inhibit business and productivity.219  This problem is the same for 
cellular phones.  In today’s society, due to concerns regarding cost and 
lack of necessity, many people abandon the old-fashioned landline 
telephone and only possess a cellular phone.220  People no longer 
memorize phone numbers and other pieces of information about 
themselves or their acquaintances because they store this information in 
their cellular phones.  Consequently, these people only have one phone, 
a cellular phone, and they store a large quantity of information in it.  
Therefore, by taking a person’s cellular phone, the police are taking that 
person’s chief mode of communication and no one can contact them and 
they cannot contact anyone.221   
By liberalizing searches and seizures for the government’s 
convenience, Fourth Amendment protections are eroded.  It is a mockery 
to those who fought for, composed, and ratified the amendment as well 
as to those that continue to seek its protection.  The file cabinet approach 
is conceptually logical because the similarities between cellular phones 
and file cabinets are significant, but the manner in which the Court has 
applied it is simply unacceptable.222  When utilizing the file cabinet 
approach, the method of searching is less likely to be intrusive and the 
owners are not as likely to be inconvenienced to a point of helplessness 
so long as they are permitted to keep the device.  Due to the failing Katz 
test and inappropriately applied analogies, privacy interests with 
cellular phones are unprotected and emergence of a new test has become 
necessary.223 
                                                 
218 United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 583 (D. Vt. 1998) (“The wholesale removal 
of computer equipment can undoubtedly disable a business or professional practice and 
disrupt personal lives, and should be avoided when possible. . . .  At the very least, the 
government should copy and return the equipment as soon as possible.”). 
219 Id. 
220 Banks, supra note 3, at 586.  “[A]s common and hightech as these wireless devices may 
appear today, in a few short years they will look positively antique.”  Id. 
221 Id.  Off-site computer searches should only take place when on-site sorting is 
“infeasible and no other practical alternative exists.”  United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 
596 (9th Cir. 1982).  If the officers cannot perform an on-site search, the officers may “seal[] 
and hold [] the documents pending approval by a magistrate of [the conditions and 
limitations on] a further search [through the documents].”  Id. at 595–96.  The wholesale 
removal must be monitored by the judgment of a magistrate.  Id. 
222 See supra Part III.B. 
223 See infra Part IV. 
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IV.  REFOCUSING:  BRINGING BACK THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Problems exist with both the interpretation and application of the 
Fourth Amendment.  First, the Katz test is impractical and outdated, as 
courts have explicitly stated that the subjective prong is unhelpful and 
the objective prong is too flexible.224  Second, the closed container 
analogy is too simplistic to apply to cellular phones, and the analogy that 
should be used, the file cabinet approach, is not being applied 
effectively.225  This Part establishes how to deal with search and seizure 
precedent with cellular phones by abandoning the Katz test that has been 
used for privacy analysis and suggesting a new test, the Dissemination 
Doctrine.226   
The Katz test is inadequate for cellular phones.  To satisfy the Katz 
test, a person claiming a Fourth Amendment violation has to actually 
possess a subjective expectation of privacy, and it has to be objectively 
determined that this expectation of privacy is one that “society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable.”227  The subjective prong has been 
ignored and disregarded as virtually nonexistent.228  Conversely, the 
objective prong is unpredictable and malleable.229  The law needs to be 
established and dependable.  Currently, the Katz test does not provide 
these characteristics to Fourth Amendment precedent. 
Moving beyond Katz, the Dissemination Doctrine, which applies to 
cellular phones, is based on two factors:  (1) whether the information was 
disseminated to others and (2) whether the file cabinet approach was 
followed.230  Thus, the Dissemination Doctrine merges recognized 
telephone precedent and the file cabinet approach.  Initially, the new test 
discards the typical Katz analysis, though it utilizes the phrase 
“expectation of privacy.”   
The first prong of the Dissemination Doctrine is that the court must 
consider whether the information was sent voluntarily, or whether it was 
contained solely within the cellular phone.  If the information was sent to 
another source, established telephone precedent asserts that the 
expectation of privacy has diminished, and the evidence will not be 
                                                 
224 See supra Part III.A. 
225 See supra Part III.B. 
226 See infra Part IV.A.  The name “Dissemination Doctrine” and the factors of this test 
were created solely by the author. 
227 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). 
228 See supra Part III.A. 
229 See supra Part III.A. 
230 United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 583 (D. Vt. 1998). 
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suppressed.  For example, if a person used the cellular phone to call a 
third party or send him a picture or text message, the courts should 
apply existing telephone precedent, which states that the Fourth 
Amendment does not protect a person’s mistaken belief that a third 
party will not disclose information to the police.231  That person loses his 
expectation of privacy because a person can never be sure to whom the 
recipient will show the message or even who is in possession of the 
cellular phone at the time he sends the message. 
However, if the information was not sent to another party but 
instead was solely contained within the cellular phone, the expectation 
of privacy still exists and the file cabinet approach must be used, which 
is the second prong of the Dissemination Doctrine.232  Because the file 
cabinet approach must be followed to ensure fair searching within the 
cellular phone, this prong prescribes such an approach.  Cellular phones 
have an organizational scheme, just like a file cabinet.233  The documents 
contained within a cellular phone and those contained in a file cabinet 
are equally significant and should be afforded equal protection.234  
Therefore, as with a file cabinet, a police officer should not be allowed to 
rummage through a cellular phone without a plan.235  Also, as the file 
cabinet approach requires, the cellular phone should remain with its 
owner after the police have downloaded its contents or used an efficient 
method to conduct the search on site.236  Ultimately, if the search is done 
in a manner that respects the file cabinet approach and no other Fourth 
Amendment violations exist, the evidence should not be suppressed. 
The Dissemination Doctrine is capable of keeping up with ever-
advancing technology.  Its principles will be effectively applied to any 
cellular phone because it does not ground itself in the cellular phone’s 
capabilities, but instead it bases its outcomes on the actions of the 
individual.  The Dissemination Doctrine applies to all cellular phones, 
                                                 
231 See supra Part II.D. 
232 See supra Part III.B. 
233 Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 410 (4th Cir. 2001). 
234 See supra Part III.B. 
235 Trulock, 275 F.3d at 410.  A major problem with searching cellular phones, which is the 
same problem that exists when searching documents in a file cabinet, arises because the 
officer must look at and read at least a portion of the contents to discern if it is relevant or 
not.  Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976).  Therefore, if the search is 
performed methodologically, less items will be read and more privacy will be protected.  
Id. 
236 See supra Part III.B. 
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regardless of their capabilities.  After all, the Court previously decided 
that the Fourth Amendment protects people and not places.237 
In the end, there are many problems with the current state of the 
Fourth Amendment when applied to cellular phones.  It is true that those 
who authored the Fourth Amendment never could have foreseen today’s 
technological successes.  In spite of this fact, the Fourth Amendment will 
again become the powerful protector the colonists intended if courts 
follow the Dissemination Doctrine.  The new test appreciates that a 
person regards his cellular phone as an intimate receptacle of personal 
information, but it simultaneously recognizes a person’s diminished 
privacy interest once that information is disseminated to others. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The mission of applying the current precedent to cellular phones is 
virtually impossible because it cannot account for continued 
advancements.  This difficulty exemplifies the necessity of a new test.  It 
is worth the time to consider changes, especially because the current 
state of the law is failing all Americans.  Yet, Americans should not 
despair because, so long as the Dissemination Doctrine is followed, 
privacy protections are in the individual’s control, hinging on each 
person’s actions.  The courts regard a true expectation of privacy as 
paramount to ascertaining whether a Fourth Amendment protection 
should be afforded, and the Dissemination Doctrine provides a fair way 
to determine whether an expectation of privacy existed in a cellular 
phone.  Therefore, with the Dissemination Doctrine, the mission of 
applying the Fourth Amendment to cellular phones is not only possible, 
it is also just. 
Following the Dissemination Doctrine, the Fourth Amendment once 
again becomes a guardian of privacy.  It recognizes that cellular phones 
are advanced and must be afforded the amount of privacy that people 
expect and deserve.  Overall, the emphasis on the Katz test should be 
lowered and the file cabinet approach must be correctly utilized.  
Cellular phones are comparable to file cabinets because they contain as 
much information as file cabinets in an organized manner, and the 
methods of searching cellular phones should mirror those followed 
when searching a file cabinet.  The Dissemination Doctrine provides law 
enforcement officials latitude so they can gather evidence because it 
                                                 
237 Recognizing that Katz is a pillar in Fourth Amendment analysis, this test does not 
suggest that Katz be completely disregarded in any Fourth Amendment claim, but suggests 
that this approach only be utilized with cellular phones and other technological devices. 
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incorporates established telephone precedent, which provides for a 
diminished expectation of privacy.  The determinative factor in Fourth 
Amendment and cellular phone analysis should be whether the 
information that the person seeks to protect was voluntarily offered to 
others. 
Now, back in the courtroom.  Ron is awaiting the ruling on his 
motion to suppress the picture of marijuana found within his cellular 
phone.  He is nervous because he is aware of the importance of this 
decision.  Ron knows that if the evidence is suppressed, he will likely not 
be convicted.  He also knows that if the evidence is not suppressed, he 
will likely go to jail and miss his daughter’s seventh birthday and her 
first school play.  Ron begins to panic and the public defender explains 
to Ron that there is a new precedent on how to decide cases involving 
searches and seizures of cellular phones.  The attorney asks Ron:  “Did 
you send the image of marijuana in your phone to any other person?”  
The answer to this question is crucial.  If he answers yes, the court will 
likely determine Ron had no expectation of privacy in the image and the 
evidence will be allowed into the trial.  If Ron answers no, the court will 
likely conclude that Ron had an expectation of privacy in the image. 
Ron thought back to the day he downloaded the picture.  He had 
suspicions that his neighbor was growing marijuana so Ron performed a 
“private investigation” by comparing the picture he found through the 
Internet on his cellular phone to the plants growing in his neighbor’s 
apartment.  After comparing the picture to the plants, Ron inadvertently 
forgot to the delete the picture from his cellular phone.  Ron begins to 
grin as he whispers a definite “no” to his attorney’s question.  The public 
defender cannot conceal his delight as he smiles, reassuring Ron that it is 
unlikely he will be convicted.  The public defender rises and begins to 
speak:  “Your honor, . . . ” but Ron did not hear a word.  He drowned out 
the legal jargon and events in the courtroom because he had a more 
pressing issue to contemplate:  He had to decide if he should buy his 
daughter a bike or a new doll for her birthday. 
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